BVerfG [2020] 2835/17 del 19 maggio 2020. Questo capitolo è stato originariamente scritto in lingua inglese. Perciò, le citazioni dirette della Sentenza presenti in questo capitolo fanno riferimento alla traduzione inglese ufficiale della stessa, pubblicata sul sito del BVerfG, disponibile su https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2020/05/rs20200519_1bvr283517en.html.

Gesetz über den Bundesnachrichtendienst – BNDG, 20 dicembre 1990.

La questione di costituzionalità faceva riferimento principalmente ai §§ 6,7 e dal §§ 13 al 15 BNDG. Si veda il par. 57.

Par. 33, gli artt. 5(1) secondo periodo e 10(1). Art 5(1): «Jeder hat das Recht, seine Meinung in Wort, Schrift und Bild frei zu äußern und zu verbreiten und sich aus allgemein zugänglichen Quellen ungehindert zu unterrichten. Die Pressefreiheit und die Freiheit der Berichterstattung durch Rundfunk und Film werden gewährleistet. Eine Zensur findet nicht statt». Art 10(1): «Das Briefgeheimnis sowie das Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnis sind unverletzlich».

BNDG, 20 dicembre 1990.

Ibidem.

Art. 1(2): «Das Deutsche Volk bekennt sich darum zu unverletzlichen und unveräußerlichen Menschenrechten als Grundlage jeder menschlichen Gemeinschaft, des Friedens und der Gerechtigkeit in der Welt». Art 1(3): «Die nachfolgenden Grundrechte binden Gesetzgebung, vollziehende Gewalt und Rechtsprechung als unmittelbar geltendes Recht».

BNDG, 20 dicembre 1990, parr. 87-89.

Ibidem, par. 89.

Ibidem, par. 94.

Ibidem, parr. 94-95.

Ibidem, par. 105.

Ibidem.

Cfr. J. Klabbers e G. Palombella (a cura di), The Challenge of Inter-legality, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2019.

Cfr. J. Klabbers e G. Palombella, Introduction, in Iid. (a cura di), The Challenge of Inter-legality, cit., pp. 1 ss.; G. Palombella, Theory, Realities, and Promises of Interlegality. A Manifesto, in ibidem, pp. 363 ss.

«The shift toward the construction of law from the angle of the case is essential to an inter-legality approach» (Klabbers e Palombella, Introduction, cit., p. 2).

Ibidem, p. 2.

Palombella, Theory, Realities, and Promises of Interlegality,cit., p. 380.

Si tratta di un’analisi computerizzata svolta tramite cross-checking e altri metodi. Si veda il par. 21 della sentenza.

BNDG, 20 dicembre 1990, parr. 16-26.

Ibidem, par. 19.

Ibidem, par. 107.

Ibidem, par. 110.

Ibidem, par. 109.

Si legga il dibattito sui modelli di diritto product versus practice in W. Van der Burg, The Dynamics of Law and Morality: A Pluralist Account of Legal Interactionism, London, Routledge, 2014, p. 10. Secondo Sanne Taekema, il modello di diritto product dà origine a una concezione sistemica dell’ordinamento giuridico, mentre un modello di diritto practice prende in considerazione un ordinamento giuridico interazionale. Si veda la discussione nel contesto dell’inter-legality in S. Taekema, Between or Beyond Legal Orders Questioning the Concept of Legal Order, in Klabbers e Palombella, The Challenge of Inter-legality, cit., pp. 69 ss.

Palombella, Theory, Realities, and Promises of Interlegality, cit., p. 366.

Ibidem.

Ibidem; W. Sadurski, con riferimento alla legalità costituzionale dell’ECtHR: Partnering with Strasbourg: Constitutionalism of the European Court of Human Rights, the Accession of Central and East European States to the Council of Europe, and the Idea of Pilot Judgments, in «Human Rights Law Review», 9, 2009, pp. 397 ss.

Palombella, Theory, Realities, and Promises of Interlegality, cit., p. 366.

Ibidem, p. 386.

Cfr. ibidem, pp. 363-390.

B. de Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading, in Id., Toward a New Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in the Paradigmatic Transition, London, Routledge, 1995, p. 473.

Ibidem.

G. Palombella enfatizza questo punto sottolineando la differenza dall’idea, offerta da Santos, di interlegality, come segue: «it is true what Santos wrote that we live “in between”. But inter-legality is not just a state of things we can exploit, and profit from contradictions and divergences among separate and mutually irrelevant normative orders. Not as a subjective sociological but as an objective legal notion, inter-legality allows us to consider the law as something different; we should pretend to avail of inter-legality also in a different sense» (Palombella, Theory, Realities, and Promises of Interlegality, cit., p. 378).

Il concetto di legal hegemony è stato ampiamente affrontato in dottrina dopo la nota sentenza PSPP del BVerfG, pronuncia del Second senate del 5 maggio 2020 – 2 BvR 859/15 –, parr. 1-237. Secondo il BVerfG, il sindacato operato dalla CJEU sulle decisioni prese dalla European Central Bank riguardo il Public Sector Purchase Program non ottempera al principio di proporzionalità. Sull’egemonia giuridica, A. von Bogdandy, German Legal Hegemony, in «Verfassungsblog», 5 ottobre 2020, disponibile presso https://verfassungsblog.de/german-legal-hegemony/. Per alcune opinioni sulla questione se l’egemonia giuridica tedesca sia materia che riguardi il diritto eurounitario, A. von Bogdandy, B. Cali, S. Cassese, P. Cruz Villalón, D. Halberstam, B. Iancu, A. Jakab, M.A. Queralt Jimenez, H. Keller, S. Bates, K. Lenaerts, R. Miller, O. Pollicino, D. Sarmiento, A. Śledzińska-Simon, P. Sonnevend, M. Steinbeis, A. Vauchez, J.H.H. Weiler e M. Wyrzykowski, German Legal Hegemony?, in «Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law & International Law (MPIL) Research Paper», 2020, n. 43, disponibile presso SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3727378.

Cfr. Palombella, Theory, Realities, and Promises of Interlegality, cit., pp. 381-382.

G. Palombella, The Rule of Law at Home and Abroad, in «Hague Journal on Rule of Law», 8, 2016, pp. 1 ss., disponibile presso https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-016-0024-z.

A. Barak, The Judge in a Democracy, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2008, p. 298 (nel senso per cui lo scrutinio giudiziale elimina i black holes legali). Il vocabolo fu coniato da Johan Steyn nel 2004. Cfr. J. Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, in «International and Comparative Law Quarterly», 53, 2004, n. 1, p. 1: «The most powerful democracy is detaining hundreds of suspected foot soldiers of the Taliban in a legal black hole at the United States naval base at Guantanamo Bay, where they await trial on capital charges by military tribunals». Nel 2006, Dyzenhaus introdusse il termine «legal grey holes» per descrivere «disguised black holes» con riferimento a situazioni in cui «there are some legal constraints on executive action – it is not a lawless void – but the constraints are so insubstantial that they pretty well permit government to do as it pleases». L’autore sottolineò che siano peggiori dei legal black holes («since such greyholes permit government to have its cake and eat it too, to seem to be governing not only by law but in accordance with the rule of law, they and their endorsement by judges and academics might be even more dangerous from the perspective of the substantive conception of the rule of law than true black holes»). Si legga D. Dyzenhaus , The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 42.

Si legga un ampio dibattito sul termine «culture of justification» e sul suo rapporto col principio di proporzionalità in M. Cohen-Eliya e I. Porat, Proportionality and the Culture of Justification, in «American Journal of Comparative Law»,59, 2011, n. 2, pp. 463 ss., disponibile su SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1623397.

Palombella, Theory, Realities, and Promises of Interlegality, cit., p. 382. Palombella impiega la parola «reconnaissance» sia in senso esplorativo sia in senso ricognitivo.

BNDG, 20 dicembre 1990, par. 94.

Klabbers e Palombella, Introduction, cit., p. 1.

F. Müller e R. Christensen, Juristische Methodik, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 201311, p. 263. Per le premesse di base di questa teoria si veda M. Klatt, Making the Law Explicit. The Normativity of Legal Argumentation,Oxford, Hart, 2008, pp. 54-56 («the text is only a “guideline”, as such it has no claim to normativity […] the rule is not the beginning, but the product of the process of the application of the law»).

Si veda un dibattito più ampio riguardo la SLT in M. Klatt, Contemporary Legal Philosophy in Germany, in «Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie», 2007, pp. 519 ss.

Ibidem.

Ibidem.

A. Paulus, National Courts and the International Rule of Law (Remarks on the book by André Nollkaemper), in «Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies», 2012, n. 5, pp. 5 ss., 8-9.

Si legga un recente dibattito sul linguaggio universalista e internazionale in M. Milanovic, Surveillance and Cyber Operations, in M. Gibney et al. (a cura di), Research Handbook on Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations, London, Routledge, 2022, pp. 10-11, disponibile presso SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3708440 o http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3708440.

BNDG, 20 dicembre 1990, parr. 94-95.

Cfr. A. Peters, Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty, in «European Journal of International Law», 20, 2009, n. 3, pp. 513 ss.

Ibidem.

Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, 7 luglio 2011, No. 55721/07, §§ 132; Big Brother Watch and Others v. United Kingdom, 13 settembre 2018, N. 58170/13 et al., Sezione 271; Center for Rättvisa v. Sweden, 19 giugno 2018, no. 35252/08.

BNDG, 20 dicembre 1990, parr. 97-98.

Cfr. M. Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties Law, Principles and Policy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011; S. Miller, Revisiting Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: A Territorial Justification for Extraterritorial Jurisdiction under the European Convention, in «European Journal of International Law», 20, 2009, n. 4, pp. 1223 ss.; M. Milanovic, Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in the Digital Age, in «Harvard International Law Journal», 56, 2015, n. 1, pp. 81 ss.

BNDG, 20 dicembre 1990, parr. 101-103.

Ibidem, par. 101.

Ibidem, par. 99. Si noti che questo articolo ha una particolare importanza dal punto di vista dell’inter-legality. Esso, sostanzialmente, supporta l’argomentazione inter-legal per due ragioni. In primo luogo, esso considera che potrebbero esserci delle legality rilevanti, in relazione al tema in esame. In secondo luogo, orienta le Corti nazionali alla ricerca di soluzioni eque. L’art. 53 della ECtHR stabilisce che «nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of any High Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a party».

Si veda un recente dibattito sulla dottrina del controllo effettivo dei diritti in Başak Çalı, Has «Control Over Rights Doctrine» for Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Come of Age? Karlsruhe, too, has spoken, now it’s Strasbourg Court?, in «Blog of European Journal of International Law», 21.07.2020 disponibile presso https://www.ejiltalk.org/has-control-over-rights-doctrine-for-extra-territorial-jurisdiction-come-of-age-karlsruhe-too-has-spoken-now-its-strasbourgs-turn/.

BNDG, 20 dicembre 1990, par. 96.

Ibidem, par. 94.

Si veda un autorevole dibattito sulla relazione tra diritti umani e fondamentali in G. Palombella, From Human Rights to Fundamental Rights: Consequences of a conceptual distinction, in «ARSP - Archiv Für Rechts- Und Sozialphilosophie», 93, 2007, n. 3, pp. 396 ss. (nel senso che i diritti umani sono imperativi deontologici che riguardano ciò che è dovuto agli esseri umani; i diritti fondamentali, invece, sono correlati agli aspetti che sono in grado di contribuire all’esistenza di una società).

UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36, par. 63. Articolo 6 dell’ICCPR: «1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. 2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgement rendered by a competent court. 3. When deprivation of life constitutes the crime of genocide, it is understood that nothing in this article shall authorize any State Party to the present Covenant to derogate in any way from any obligation assumed under the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be granted in all cases. 5. Sentenceof death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women. 6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition of capital punishment by any State Party to the present Covenant».

OHCHR, Report on the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, 2014.

Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Environment and Human rights Advisory Opinion, OC-23/17, 15 novembre 2017, Serie A N. 23/17, par. 104(h).

Cfr. P. Margulies, The NSA in Global Perspective: Surveillance, Human Rights, and International Counterterrorism, in «Fordham Law Review», 2014, pp. 2137-2167, in particolare 2148-2152 (nel senso che uno Stato esercita un virtual control sull’infrastruttura di comunicazioni quando esso attua procedure di sorveglianza); M. Land e J. Aronson, New Technologies for Human Rights and Practice, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2018, pp. 236-239.

Cfr. Land e Aronson, New Technologies for Human Rights and Practice, cit., pp. 236-239.

Ibidem.

Art. 12: «No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks».

Art. 17(1): «1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation».

Cfr. Palombella, Theory, Realities, and Promises of Interlegality, cit., p. 363; J.L. Dunoff e J.P. Trachtman, Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009; M. Tushnet, The Inevitable Globalisation of Constitutional Law, in «Virginia Journal of International Law», 49, 2009, pp. 985 ss.

Cfr. Palombella, Theory, Realities, and Promises of Interlegality, cit., p. 363.

Cfr. ibidem.

Cfr. ibidem, p. 364.

Cfr. ibidem, pp. 364-365.

WHO announced COVID-19 outbreak as a pandemic on 11 March 2020. Disponibile presso https://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/health-emergencies/coronavirus-covid-19#:~:text=WHO%20announced%20COVID%2D19,on%2011%20March%202020.

Si vedano gli aggiornamenti recenti sulla crisi presso https://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/health-emergencies/coronavirus-covid-19#:~:text=WHO%20announced%20COVID%2D19,on%2011%20March%202020.

WHO chief warns against COVID-19 vaccine nationalism, disponibile presso https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-10-26/WHO-chief-warns-against-COVID-19-vaccine-nationalism-UTD8hxtXeE/index.html. Si legga un paper recente che opina che la crisi da COVID-19 rischi di rafforzare dinamiche nazionali preesistenti in F. Bieber, Global Nationalism in Times of the COVID-19 Pandemic, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, Nationalities Papers, 2020, pp. 1-13.

Palombella, Theory, Realities, and Promises of Interlegality, cit., p. 382, ove si utilizza il vocabolo reconnaissance in un senso sia esplorativo sia ricognitivo.

Ibidem.

Si trae ispirazione da Steyn per l’espressione «virtual legal black holes», cfr. supra, nota 38.