Edoardo Chiti, Alberto di Martino, Gianluigi Palombella (a cura di)
L'era dell'interlegalità
DOI: 10.1401/9788815370334/c17
Moving specifically to the question of environmental protection, the Court started by underlying the close connection between environmental protection, sustainable development and human rights, as proclaimed in a number of soft law instruments, including the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development [101]
. It is on the basis of the close relationships
{p. 490}between these three concepts, that the Court declared the existence of an autonomous right to a healthy environment, in its view, recognized by “numerous human rights protection systems” [102]
. While the Court acknowledged that the right to a healthy environment is affirmed in the Protocol of San Salvador, in light of its non-justiciability, it boldly grounded the existence of the right in article 26 of the Convention. Interestingly, originally article 26 of the Convention was interpreted as simply requiring the States parties to adopt necessary measures to progressively achieve the realization of the rights “implicit in the economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural standards set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American States” (“OAS Charter”) [103]
. However, since its recent Case of Lagos del Campo v. Peru from 2017, the Court established its competence to declare direct violations of economic, social, cultural and environmental rights recognized in the OAS Charter on the basis of article 26 [104]
. Although the environmental protection per se is not mentioned anywhere in the OAS Charter, in the Court’s view, it can nevertheless be derived from the document by virtue of its articles 30, 31, 33 and 34 that refer to States’ obligations to achieve “integral development” [105]
. Indeed, the implications of including the right to healthy environment under the scope of article 26 are consequential as it makes this right directly justiciable in the Inter-American system, potentially opening the door to new categories of environmental claims [106]
. {p. 491}
Importantly, in its reasoning, the Court characterized the right to a healthy environment as a “fundamental right for the existence of humankind” that
has both individual and also collective connotations. In its collective dimension, the right to a healthy environment constitutes a universal value that is owed to both present and future generations. That said, the right to a healthy environment also has an individual dimension insofar as its violation may have a direct and an indirect impact on the individual owing to its connectivity to other rights, such as the rights to health, personal integrity, and life [107]
.
It further stressed that in its collective dimension, the right grants the protection to the nature itself, thereby moving away from traditional instrumental human rights approach to environment:
as an autonomous right, the right to a healthy environment, unlike other rights, protects the components of the environment, such as forests, rivers and seas, as legal interests in themselves, even in the absence of the certainty or evidence of a risk to individuals. This means that it protects nature and the environment, not only because of the benefits they provide to humanity or the effects that their degradation may have on other human rights, such as health, life or personal integrity, but because of their importance to the other living organisms with which we share the planet that also merit protection in their own right [108]
.
At the same time, the Court noted that, in addition to the autonomous content of the right to a healthy environment, there are also several substantive and procedural Convention rights that are most likely to be affected by environmental degradation, including the rights to life, personal integrity, private life, health, water, food, housing, participation in cultural life and property, as well as the rights to informa{p. 492}tion, to participation in decision-making and to an effective remedy [109]
. It then turned to specifying States’ obligations in the field of environmental protection that are linked to rights to life and to personal integrity that formed the center of Colombia’s request. On the basis of extensive thirty-pages analysis of rules and principles of international environmental law, the Court first affirmed that the State parties are under the obligation to prevent environmental harm within and outside their territory [110]
. In this regard, as the central tenet of States’ environmental obligations, the Court put forward the concept of due diligence, understood as a category of obligations of conduct, as opposed to obligations of result [111]
. On the basis of the principle of due diligence applied to the situations of transboundary harm, the Court identified a series of further specific obligations, namely that of prevention, precaution, cooperation, as well as procedural duties relating to environmental protection, including the right of access to information, the right to public participation in environmental decision-making and access to justice to persons affected by environmental harm [112]
. It further noted that for the purposes of establishing responsibility of the State party under the Convention, there should be a causal link between the harmful act that originated in the respondent state territory and the violation of the Convention right of individual, located on its territory or abroad [113]
.
To sum up, the Court’s inter-legal reasoning in the Advisory Opinion, represented by strong integration of international environmental law within the Inter-American human rights system, paved the way to a historical recognition of the autonomous right to a healthy environment that is directly enforceable before the Court. Moreover, recognition of both individual and collective dimensions {p. 493}of the right potentially opens new avenues for advancing environmental claims for the protection of the environment per se, even in absence of direct harm to individuals. Indeed, at the time when the Advisory Opinion was issued, it yet remained to be seen how exactly the right to a healthy environment was to be adjudicated in contentious cases before the Court. However, three years later, the Court delivered its judgment on the Indigenous Communities Members of the Lhaka Honhat (Our Land) Association v. Argentina, in which the Court, reiterating its Advisory Opinion, found the violation of the right to a healthy environment for the first time in a contentious case [114]
. In particular, in this case, the IACtHR ruled that although Argentina was aware of illegal deforesting and fencing occurring on indigenous territories belonging to Lhaka Honhat communities, it fell short of preventing these harmful activities [115]
. On this basis, the Court requested the State to submit a report within one year outlining the actions that it intend to take with regard to conservation and recovery of the groundwater and forestry resources in the indigenous territories [116]
. In addition, the IACtHR ordered Argentina to establish the Community Development Fund for promoting the indigenous culture, including the implementation of the programs related to recovery of natural food resources [117]
.

4. Conclusion

To summarize, the current chapter aimed at demonstrating the value of inter-legality approach in advancing environmental justice in the Inter-American human rights system. In doing so, it first discussed the two competing {p. 494}understandings of the goals of environmental law regime vis-à-vis the human rights law: the “instrumental” approach, in which the objectives of both regimes are corresponding and consist of enhancing the quality of individuals’ lives; and the “intrinsic” approach, which aims at the protection of global ecosystem as a whole by balancing the needs of present and future generations. The second approach – being dominant in the scholarly and policy debates – underscores the overlapping but different rationales of the two regimes, thereby highlighting both contributions and limitations of the human rights framework in advancing environmental agenda. To advance this claim, the paper evaluated three approaches employed by the Inter-American Court in adjudicating environmental claims from the perspective of inter-legality, namely the human rights “greening”, the “environmental democracy” approach and the “genesis theory”.
The three approaches presented herein highlight the margin of discretion that human rights Courts have in applying environmental law norms together with their own regimes, resulting in varying outcomes in terms of balancing the objectives of individual human rights protection and environmental protection conceived as a value in its own right. In particular, the first approach of the Inter-American Court focused on “greening” the existing Convention rights can be described as parochial, operating exclusively within the logic of its own human rights regime. As demonstrated, although “the human rights greening” has had some success in cases involving the rights of indigenous population, its role in advancing fully-fledged environmental agenda remains limited as it only addresses environmental claims with proven harm to the well-being of specific individual or a group of individuals. In other words, the underlying rationale of such approach is the protection of the environment not for its own sake but as a precondition for the enjoyment of human rights.
Instead, the two remaining approaches rate better both from the perspective of inter-legality and in light of their potential value in advancing environmental justice. In particular, the “environmental democracy” approach by the
{p. 495}IACtHR, with focus on procedural environmental rights, comes close to acknowledging the environment as a matter of a wider public interest. In fact, due to the incorporation of the Aarhus Convention’s public interest model into the interpretation of the Convention rights, this second approach of the Court can be characterized as at partially inter-legal, going beyond the traditional victim-based logic of the human rights regime. However, while procedural and participatory rights are important in environmental field, they fall short of consolidating the status of environmental protection as a substantive legal limit on the discretion of decision-makers. From this perspective, the third approach by the Inter-American Court consisting of recognizing the autonomous right to a healthy environment in the Advisory Opinion OC-23/17 can be characterized as the most efficient way for advancing environmental justice. Relatedly, it also represents as a fully-fledged inter-legal approach, due to extensive incorporation of environmental law norms and standards into the Court’s reasoning. As discussed, it is precisely this systematic reading of the Convention in light of the entire corpus iuris of environmental law that lead the Court to update the catalogue of the Convention rights with the autonomous right to a healthy environment. Of equal importance is the fact that the IACtHR proclaimed this right to be directly enforceable before the Court in both individual and collective dimensions or, in other words, both in cases where its violation has a direct impact on individuals but also in absence of such impact. Thus, the adoption of inter-legality stance by the Court opened new exciting possibilities for fostering environmental justice, while at the same time strengthening the status of environment as a universal and fundamental value in its own right.
Note
[101] Ibidem, parr. 47-49, 52-54. It also previously affirmed a global consensus on ‘undeniable’ interrelationships between environment and human rights, as evidenced by the positions adopted by the Inter-American Commission, the OAS General Assembly, the European Court of Human Rights, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, as well as the UN Independent Expert on human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment (see parr. 47-51).
[102] Ibidem, par. 55.
[103] American Convention on Human Rights, adopted on 22 November 1969, article 26, emphasis added.
[104] The Environment and Human Rights Advisory Opinion, cit., par. 57, footnote 86, referring to Lagos del Campo v. Peru (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs), Case No. 340 (31 August 2017), parr. 142-144.
[105] Ibidem, parr. 57, footnote 85.
[106] Indeed, this remained the most controversial aspect of the Advisory Opinion, with Judges Sierra Porto and Vio Grossi dissenting on the direct justiciability of the right to a healthy environment before the Court. The IACtHR additionally noted that the right to a healthy environment is recognized in domestic systems of several American States, as well as the American Declaration on the Right of Indigenous Peoples, the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and the Arab Charter on Human Rights; see ibidem, par. 58.
[107] Ibidem.
[108] Ibidem, par. 62.
[109] Ibidem, parr. 64-66.
[110] Ibidem, par. 101.
[111] Ibidem, par. 123.
[112] Ibidem, par. 125.
[113] Ibidem.
[114] Indigenous Communities Members of the Lhaka Honhat (Our Land) Association v. Argentina (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, Case No. 400 (6 February, 2020).
[115] Ibidem, parr. 272-289.
[116] Ibidem, parr. 331-336.
[117] Ibidem, parr. 337-342.