L'era dell'interlegalità
DOI: 10.1401/9788815370334/c13
As we have noted, social content
moderation has long been a privilege of the platforms. However, two major
po
¶{p. 375}litical events occurred in 2016 – the launching of the Brexit
process and the US elections – have led to a reconsideration of their role in both the
US and the world. Targeted ads spreading fake news used to target voters in the UK and
the US raised concerns over the standard of moderation and regulatory control over
platforms. Mass spread of hate speech and disinformation led the platforms to begin
policing their content more and more, and regulatory pressures exercised by various
States contributed to this. In 2017, Germany passed the Network Enforcement Act (Netz
DG), a piece of legislation targeting social networks with more than two million
registered users in Germany – namely Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. This law did not
introduce new criminal acts but seeks to enforce the existing criminal legislation for
specific criminal acts
[47]
.
In the meantime, the platforms began
to engage in a cartel-like behavior, which meant that the removal of one piece of
content by one platform would soon trigger such a removal in other platforms
[48]
. This effect was beneficial for the suppression of terrorist recruitment and
promotion, as it led to the creation of the Global Internet Forum for Countering
Terrorism – a forum for the exchange of information on terrorist practices in social
networks. With the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, platforms moved aggressively to take
down many of the disinformation and conspiracy theories related to the pandemic. In this
same ¶{p. 376}period, Twitter flagged posts by the US President as
factually untrue, also limiting the ability to distribute his tweets thereby beginning
to act as an editor going beyond its obligations under Section 230 of the CDA
[49]
. This prompted fears of censorship and, as a political response, calls for
amendments of Section 230 of the US CDA and calls for a regulatory approach that would
use competition law to limit the power of the big companies
[50]
.
These challenges to the content
moderation policy from both US and non-US regulators have marked an end of the era in
which the internal legal standards of the platforms were grounded in the permissive
liberal tradition
[51]
. The platforms’ internal deliberation on the content began to include the
elements of an approach typical of judicial deliberation before the international human
rights tribunals including the invocations of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights
[52]
.
Once the social platforms began
placing greater weight on balancing between their tradition of content moderation which
was traditionally liberal and the pressure from national regulators, they found
themselves in the ecosystem of inter-legality. Rules of the three different legal orders
applied here: international law, national regulation, and private moderation standards
that the platforms developed. Surely, the rules of international law enshrined primarily
in Articles 19 and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil
¶{p. 377}and Political Rights were relevant, even when the platforms had
just begun operating. However, it was only in 2018 that the UN Special Rapporteur
highlighted the international law as a source of normativity that should govern content moderation
[53]
. While academics have made calls for its application
[54]
, a specific reference to this body of law was made only in January 2021 with
the first decisions of the Facebook Oversight Board.
The second legality comes from the
national regulators, which, as said above, have been increasingly interested in the
regulation of platforms through legislation. The tools allowing the regulators to
challenge the platforms are now not only legal but also technological. These include the
ability of the national regulator to not only administer fines but also order a decrease
in bandwidth or a complete block of the traffic from a particular site
[55]
. Further, both German law and other recently proposed legislation aim to
apply extraterritorially by limiting access to content that originated outside of these jurisdictions
[56]
. The recent decision of the EU Court of Justice of the EU in an Austrian
defamation case went in the same direction: if the court in one member State orders a
takedown of the social media content, then the social platform is obliged to carry out
the takedown by effectively banning it in all EU member States, regardless of whether
the content was used for purposes other than defamation
[57]
. Thus, these laws and decisions limit the right ¶{p. 378}to
receive foreign speech as an integral part of freedom of expression
[58]
.
Surely, the current state of
technology enables the use of the so-called Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), software
that in some situations may enable the users from one jurisdiction to access Internet
content banned in that jurisdiction making the reach of the aforementioned solutions imperfect
[59]
. However, this software is not accessible or affordable to many, and it is
impossible to predict what the future holds considering its future access or
development. The other alternative, migrating users to other platforms that are more
supportive of the kind of speech and content moderation they prefer, would also not
solve many of the problems. Suggested as the “market response” to the issue of platforms
as early as 1995
[60]
, this method would have a fragmenting effect on the speech forums across
political and cultural lines and would just increase the number of platforms being
targeted by the legislators.
The content moderation standards
remain the third normativity governing the situation concerning platforms as mediators
in the free speech triangle. The pressure that we described herein has revealed access
to justice as the main problem of this normativity. It was only in October 2020 that
Facebook allowed a clear complaint procedure for the removed content or for requests
that a content be removed. Even so, the lengthy period between the complaint and the
decision does not ensure a speedy resolution or protection of the rights of speakers.
Thus, this third normativity remains essential for the users and their protection of the
right to freedom of speech. However, this normativity is not only balancing the demands
of national regulators and (to a ¶{p. 379}much lesser extent)
international law, but it is also balancing proportionality – enshrined in the decisions
of content moderators – with probability – enshrined in the automatic takedowns of
content performed by the AI
[61]
. Thus, within this normativity, both inter-legal and intra-legal balancing
[62]
occurs: inter-legal, when the platforms decide whether to follow their own
guidelines or the freedom of speech standards existing within jurisdiction; and
intra-legal, when they run proportionality tests between different principles and values
on which their governance rules are based.
4. The Virtuality of the Vantage Point and A Three-Step Analysis
It is in this clash between the
three legal orders (the national, the international and the platform) that the content
moderation and consequentially the limits to the freedom of speech are shaped. Taking an
approach of inter-legality here we analyze this dilemma through a three-step analysis:
(i) taking the vantage point of the affair – the case at hand – seriously, (ii)
understanding the relevant normativities controlling the case, and (iii) looking at the
demands of justice stemming from the case
[63]
.
Regarding the first step, the angle
of the case is fundamental to an inter-legality approach. As Palombella and Klabbers
claim,
one does not need the ascent to a juridical heaven for ready-made and principled justice – a deracinated, universalist point – to realize that different legal orders may overlap normatively and reach beyond their own limits. On the contrary, an inter-legality perspective simply happens to be taken as soon as the vantage point of the concrete affair under scrutiny – the case at hand – is taken seriously [64] .¶{p. 380}
Note
[47] Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen Netzwerken (Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz - NetzDG) (2017). Available at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/netzdg/BJNR335210017.html. For the platforms, it establishes the obligation to remove content that features use of symbols of unconstitutional organizations, forming terrorist organizations, incitement of masses, including denial of the Holocaust, child pornography, insult, malicious gossip, defamation, violation of intimate privacy by taking photographs or other images, and threatening commission of serious criminal offence. See P. Zurth, The German NetzDG as Role Model Or Cautionary Tale? – Implications for the Debate on Social Media Liability, Fordham Intellectual Property, in «Media and Entertainment Law Journal», 2021, pp. 1084 ff.
[48] E. Douek, The Rise of Content Cartels, Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia, 2020.
[49] Trump’s social media bans are raising new questions on tech regulation CNBC Jan 11, 2021 (https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/11/facebook-twitter-trump-ban-raises-questions-in-uk-and-europe.html)
[50] I. Brown, Interoperability as a tool for competition regulation. Open Forum Academy, 2020 (explaining the different regulatory approaches that could limit the power of the platforms).
[51] J. Thai, Facebook’s Speech Code and Policies: How They Suppress Speech and Distort Democratic Deliberation, in «American University Law Review», 69, 2020, pp. 1641 ff.
[52] The first few decisions of the Facebook Oversight Board issued in January 2021 with their invocation of the Article 19 and 20 of the ICCPR as well as the United Nations’ Human Rights Committee are instructive in this sense. See Case Decision 2020-003-FB-UA at https://oversightboard.com/decision/FB-QBJDASCV/.
[53] Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression No. A/HRC/38/35 (Jun.2018)
[54] See S. Benesch, But Facebook’s Not a Country: How to Interpret Human Rights Law for Social Media Companies, in «Yale Journal on Regulation», 2020, pp. 86 ff.
[55] For example, the Turkish legislator has considered such a solution. See a recent discussion in Turkish law tightening rules on social media comes into effect, 1.10.2020, available at https://www.euronews.com/2020/10/01/turkish-law-tightening-rules-on-social-media-comes-into-effect.
[56] See Zurth, The German NetzDG, cit., 257.
[57] Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland (C-18/18).
[58] See excellent discussion in J. Thai, The Right to Receive Foreign Speech, in «Oklahoma Law Review», 71, 2018, p. 269.
[59] See T. Sardá, S. Natale, N. Sotirakopoulos and M. Monaghan, Understanding Online Anonymity, in «Media, Culture & Society», 41, 2019, n. 4, pp. 559 ff.
[60] See G. David, Anarchy State and the Internet, in «Journal of Online Law», 1995, article 3, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=943456.
[61] See Douek, The Rise of Content Cartels, cit., p. 52.
[62] See the chapter by Gabriel Encinas in this volume.
[63] See Klabbers and Palombella, Introduction, cit., pp. 1-16.
[64] Ibidem, p. 2.