Mediterranean Economies 2023
DOI: 10.1401/9788815411167/c1
Opposition to President Saïed
continued to intensify amid growing concern over human rights abuses. Since August
2021, international NGOs such as Amnesty International have accused security forces
of responding to peaceful protests with arbitrary arrests and the military judiciary
of conducting unfair trials, pointing to an alarming erosion of Tunisia’s human
rights protections in the process. Finally, in December 2022, the presidency
proceeded to push through new legislative elections, amidst the boycott of major
parties. The record-low turnout (8.8 per cent, according to the electoral
authorities [Africa News 2022b]), again underscored the extent of Tunisia’s
democratic backsliding, with numerous calls from the opposition for President Saïed
to step down amidst an increasingly worrying socio-economic crisis in the country.
The Tunisian economy, already severely weakened by a decade of political and
institutional turmoil, has continued to deteriorate due to the combined shocks of
the COVID-19 pandemic followed by the war in Ukraine. The rapid growth of public
debt, combined with high inflation (8.6 per cent) and ongoing shortages of many food
commodities, makes Tunisia’s short to medium future highly uncertain. In light of
such challenges, Tunisia has continued to look to outside financial support. In
mid-December 2022, the European Investment Bank approved a €220m loan including
€150m in emergency food support while on 1 December, Algeria pledged a $200m
low-interest loan and $100m financial assistance to Tunisia. On 15 October, Tunisia
also reached a further 48-month long agreement with the IMF for $1.9 billion to
support the country’s struggling economic policies [International Monetary Fund
2022a].
¶{p. 45}
2.2. Libya: A Crisis Without Perspectives?
Between mid-2021 and late 2022,
the initial optimism that had emerged in the wake of the UN-led diplomatic process
on Libya and the establishment of a nationally-based Libyan Political Dialogue Forum
(LPDF) dissipated as Libyan elites again reverted to divisions and rivalry. In March
2021, a new interim Government of National Unity (GNU) was formed under the
leadership of Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah. Based in Tripoli, the GNU was
charged with preparing the groundwork for the much-anticipated December 2021
national elections, while seeking to promote national reconciliation between Tripoli
and Tobruk, where the Libyan parliament, or House of Representatives (HoR) is based.
Indeed, among the tasks agreed upon by the LPDF, the most important was the need to
restore unity among Libya’s disparate political, economic and military institutions,
helping to secure the legal and constitutional framework for new elections to be
held. Yet the initial consensus that had apparently emerged between elites rapidly
evaporated over the subsequent months, ultimately leading to the vote’s postponement
and new divisions in the country in 2022 [Badi and Lacher 2022].
As a result, little progress was
made over the past year on key security issues such as the disarmament and
demobilisation of militias, work on a new constitution or a genuine reintegration of
fragmented institutions such as the Libyan Central Bank. Instead, what took centre
stage was the debate on the legal framework for elections, a theme strictly related
to the power struggles underway between the various political, economic and military
elites in Libyan politics and associated with the Tripoli or HoR centres of power.
With the elections postponed and severe rivalry and even instances of military
clashes amongst militias associated with various contenders, the UN and EU’s hope
for the emergence of a new, legitimate and united Libyan government were dashed.
Widespread concerns of a possible relapse into civil war emerged as a result, while
socio-economic indicators across the country continued to worsen. In an effort to
avoid such a scenario Stephanie Williams, the new acting UN Special Representative
for Libya, quickly sought to relaunch the political dialogue process, promising new
elections by June 2022. In this context, the Special Representative also introduced
an important change in the UN ¶{p. 46}roadmap: the need for prior
approval of any new constitutional text by Tripoli and Tobruk. To this end, the UN
representative established a Joint Committee between the HoR and the High State
Council (HSC) linked to the Tripoli GNU [Zaptia 2022d]. The Committee gathered in
Tunis and Cairo on several occasions but ultimately failed to come to a final
agreement on eligibility requirements for the presidential elections, thereby again
setting the stage for their delay beyond June.
In the interim, old rivalries
resurfaced and relations between the GNU and HoR took a turn for the worse, as
Aguila Saleh, head of the HoR, moved to undermine Dbeibah by coming to an
understanding with Fathi Bashagha whereby on 10 February the HoR designated the
latter as the new Prime Minister
[14]
. Then, on 1 March, the HoR unilaterally announced the establishment of a
new interim government – the Government of National Stability (GNS) – led by
Bashagha, tasking it to replace Dbeibah and implement a programme based on drafting
the constitution and deferring any decision on elections after its approval. The HoR
decision, in line with Saleh’s unilateralist approach, was undoubtedly irregular
from a legal point of view and was vehemently criticised by many Libyans, and failed
to receive backing from the UN. Dbeibah strongly rejected the HoR decision by
asserting his own legitimacy and promising to go ahead and work for the June
elections [Zaptia 2022b; 2022c]. The UN’s approach to the
GNS led much of the international community to maintain its support for the Tripoli
government, so that in the end the Dbeibah-led GNU remained in place and with most
recognition internationally.
This essentially returned Libya
to its preceding dualism, with Dbeibah and Bashagha competing and disagreeing on the
sequencing of reforms and the constitutional drafting process, the need for a
presidential or parliamentary system and the holding or postponement of elections
[15]
. As a consequence of this renewed rivalry, security clashes and fears of
violence between western militias supporting one or the other candidate resurfaced
during the year [Zaptia 2022a]. Meanwhile, following the postponement
¶{p. 47}of the June 2022 vote, UN Representative Williams resigned
in July, amidst efforts by Russia to prevent the appointment of other
Western-supported envoys and even threaten to end the UN mission to Libya altogether
[Lederer 2022]. Ultimately, such eventualities were avoided and a new Special
Representative for Libya, Abdoulaye Bathily, was approved with some delay in
September 2022, vowing to continue efforts to bridge the divide between the GNU and
GNS and prepare the groundwork for elections [United Nations Secretary General
2022]. In this context, Bathily has continued efforts to broker dialogue and
compromise between the HoR and HSC [UN News 2022c; 2022], but an initial meeting
originally scheduled for 4 December never took place [The Libya Update 2023],
casting some doubts over the practicability of such an approach or the concrete
possibilities of holding elections in 2023 [Khalifa 2022].
2.3. Morocco-Algeria and the Western Sahara
Between mid-2021 and August
2022, there were no major changes in Morocco and Algeria on the domestic front.
Events that occurred in both countries, such as legislative elections in Morocco in
September 2021 and the ongoing crackdown on opposition figures in Algeria, are part
of a dynamic that manifested itself over previous years: the retrenchment of public
space after successive instances of popular protests in both 2011 and 2019. At the
regional level, the Western Sahara question remains a key area of contention between
Morocco and Algeria, and has increasingly assumed greater relevance also for the EU
and Tunisia. Similarly, the Sahel region continues to pose a threat to the stability
of North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa as well as a ground for increased competition
between Rabat and Algiers.
In Morocco, King Mohammed VI
remains solidly in power, having adopted a new constitution following the popular
unrest of 2011. This shifted some authority to parliament from the monarchy, but
effectively Morocco’s institutional structure and political system still do not
allow the ruling party to enjoy full independence from the monarchy. While heading
the government from 2011-2021, the Islamic Justice and Development party (PJD)
failed to implement significant change, essentially giving up on
¶{p. 48}its pledges to fight corruption and implement judicial
reform [Caruso 2021]. This failure in part explains the results of the September
2021 legislative elections, where the PJD won only 12 seats compared to the 126
gained in 2016 [Al Jazeera 2021; Masbah 2021]. The National Rally of Independents
(RNI) and the Istiqlal Party, both closely aligned with the monarchy, were instead
the primary victors. Pro-palace parties and technocrats subsequently formed the
government and are unlikely to pose significant challenges to Mohamed VI’s
authority, demonstrating that the post-2011 era of reforms is over. The prime
minister, Aziz Akhannouch (RNI), is a businessman whose oil-and-gas fortune is
reportedly worth $2 billion according to Forbes and is the
second-richest person in Morocco after the king.
Regional dynamics such as the
civil wars in Libya and the rise of the jihadist threat in the Sahel region continue
to be exploited by the monarchy to prevent further political openings. The
authorities keep using a number of financial and legal mechanisms to punish critical
journalists. Akhbar al-Youm editor-in-chief Soulaimane
Raissouni was sentenced in July 2021 to five years in prison on charges of sexual
assault in a ruling the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) and other rights
groups described as fraudulent [Freedom House 2022b]. In March 2022, Amnesty
International accused Morocco of being among the governments worldwide that used the
Israeli-made NSO Group’s invasive Pegasus spyware to put human rights activists,
political leaders, journalists and lawyers around the world under unlawful
surveillance [Amnesty International 2022].
From an economic perspective,
according to the World Bank, the strong economic rebound in 2021 has enabled Morocco
to recover most of the output and job losses caused by the COVID-19 crisis, but new
strains linked to energy and food price imports are likely to further dent Morocco’s
economic standing [World Bank 2022]. The combined effect of the most severe drought
Morocco has seen in over three decades [Churm 2022; Agence France-Presse 2022] and
rising international prices of food, fertilizers, energy and commodities due to the
war in Ukraine will increase Rabat’s import bill and public subsidies, thereby
impacting the current budget balance.
Similar domestic dynamics may be
said to have occurred in Algeria. After exploiting the COVID-19 pandemic to crack
¶{p. 49}down on opposition figures, the Algerian regime has
intensified repression against the last voices of dissent in 2021-2022, hoping to
put an end to the Hirak protest movement. In May 2021, the
regime banned unauthorized rallies by the Hirak, the 2019
popular protest movement that pushed former President Bouteflika to resign, in an
effort to stop the protests. The same month, the authorities declared the
pro-autonomy movement in the Kabylie region and the Rachad movement, which counts
members of the banned Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) among its members, as «terrorist
organizations», and arrested several individuals [Freedom House 2022a].
At the political level,
opposition parties continue to play a marginal role in parliament and are subjected
to detention and prosecution, while the army continues to maintain its long-standing
influence on domestic and international affairs [Peña 2022]. At the economic level,
the rise in global energy prices is fuelling the country’s economic growth. Despite
the high international energy prices and the increased interest of the EU (Italy in
particular) in Algeria as a supplier of natural gas to diminish dependence on
Russia, high unemployment and socio-economic inequality prevail across the country.
Yet, in order to ease social tensions, in February 2022 the government began
distributing unemployment benefits of about 90 USD per month to citizens aged 19 to
40 [Africa News 2022c]. This was partly necessary given that in late 2021 the
Algerian regime introduced steps to remove subsidies on cooking oil, wheat flour,
domestic gas and electricity in order to respond to fiscal deficits and balance of
payments issues.
Moving on to address the Western
Sahara issue, deep divergences persist between Morocco and Algeria, heightening
bilateral tensions but also involving the broader region as both Rabat and Algiers
seek to convince other states in Europe and Africa to back their respective
positions.
According to Rabat, some form of
autonomy for Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty is the only possible way to
solve the conflict. The plan, which Morocco submitted to the UN in 2007, calls for
integrating Western Sahara into Morocco, with the Sahrawi people managing their
internal affairs while being represented internationally by Morocco. Conversely,
Algeria has remained firm in its traditional policy of supporting a referendum
¶{p. 50}in Western Sahara, reiterating its support for the UN
Special Representative, Staffan de Mistura, and for direct negotiations without
preconditions between Morocco and the Polisario Front on the basis of the 1991 joint
settlement plan, which includes holding a referendum on the future status of Western
Sahara.