Against this backdrop, Morocco has underscored how positions on Western Sahara deeply influence how the kingdom considers its neighbours and partners [Medias 24 2022]. The issue was at the centre of Mohamed VI’s latest address to the nation in August 2022. «I would like to send a clear message to the world: the Sahara issue is the prism through which Morocco views its international environment» calling on allies to «clarify their stance [...] in an unequivocal manner».

The King did not specify which countries he was addressing, but saluted the United States’ «incontrovertible» position [Ibidem]. In December 2020, the Trump administration had unilaterally recognised Moroccan sovereignty over the entirety of Western Sahara and reaffirmed its support for the Moroccan 2007 plan in the context of efforts to convince Rabat to normalise relations with Israel.

Over the past two years, Morocco’s stance on Western Sahara has enjoyed growing international support, with nearly 30 countries opening consulates in the country’s southern regions. A recent addition to the list is Chad which, in September 2022, expressed its intention to open a consulate in Dakhla, as a recognition of Morocco’s territorial integrity [Agence Marocaine de Presse 2022]. In the same month, during the 51st session of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in Geneva, 35 countries (most of which are African, Arab and South American) renewed their support for Morocco’s territorial integrity and sovereignty over Western Sahara. Calling for the 2007 Moroccan autonomy plan, the group – which was led by the UAE – praised UNSC Resolution 2026, the latest resolution adopted in October 2021 that calls for a «realistic, practical, and lasting political solution» to the Western Sahara issue [Zouiten 2022].

At the European level, Spain has supported the Moroccan initiative on autonomy as a credible solution to the conflict. After half a century of formal Spanish neutrality, Madrid’s endorsement is a significant diplomatic victory for Rabat. Being the former colonial power that governed Western Sahara, Spain enjoys some ¶{p. 51}leadership in Europe on the issue and might influence other European countries to follow suit. However, at the time of writing, France and Germany have merely acknowledged the autonomy plan as «a contribution» to solve the issue but not necessarily the best and most credible solution to break the impasse. Spain’s new stance goes hand in hand with its need to cooperate on migration flows with Morocco. In May 2021, Morocco demonstrated its ability to exert strong pressure, through migration, on countries, such as Spain, that do not directly ally themselves with Rabat’s position over Western Sahara. Following Spain’s decision to host Polisario Front leader Ghali for medical treatment, Rabat relaxed its border controls with the Spanish enclave of Ceuta, leading about 8.000 people to cross into Europe and sparking what is known as the «Melissa crisis». After this crisis, the Spanish government was also hacked by the Israel-developed spyware Pegasus that had been used by the Moroccan authorities to control its political activists [Bartolomé 2022]. Most of the Spanish opposition has harshly criticized the government’s stance on Western Sahara [Bartolomé 2022]. Not surprisingly, Spain’s 2022 decision to support Morocco’s plan damaged diplomatic and energy relations with Algeria. Right after Spain’s decision, Algeria recalled its ambassador while promising that it would continue to supply Madrid with gas, and that there would be no break in the contracts already signed. In 2021, Algeria supplied more than 40 per cent of the natural gas imported by Spain, most of which is transported through the Medgaz submarine pipeline. Despite the initial promises, the Spanish about-face is likely to have implications for new hydrocarbon contracts between Madrid and Algiers [Jeune Afrique 2022]. In April 2022, Algeria stated that it would terminate gas supplies to Spain if Madrid sold any Algerian gas to other countries, citing what it said was a Spanish decision to supply gas to Morocco via pipeline [Reuters 2022a].

With regard to Algeria, the Ukraine war and the ensuing energy crisis in Europe have increased the country’s weight internationally, given its extensive energy supplies and the existence of the pipeline infrastructure connecting it to Europe (Italy & Spain). Italy, in particular, has turned to Algeria as a major energy provider, which by late 2022 led Algiers to become Italy’s top natural gas provider, supplanting Russia. Algeria’s newfound importance in regional energy markets may have two implications. ¶{p. 52}First, it may lead to a delay, weakening or halt in the growing international recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, particularly in Europe, while helping to break Algeria’s growing diplomatic isolation. Indeed, Algeria is Africa’s largest exporter of natural gas and in 2022 agreed to increase supplies to Italy and France [Africa News 2022a; Le Monde and Agence France-Presse 2022]. This had immediate repercussions on Algeria’s relations with Paris, after a long period of tensions over the decolonisation process which led Algiers to recall its ambassador from Paris in 2021. In August 2022, President Macron visited Algeria with a 90-person delegation of ministers and business leaders [News Wires 2022]. The meeting addressed the possibility of an increase in deliveries of Algerian gas and LNG (liquefied natural gas) to France, in a proportion that the two countries have not yet officially disclosed. According to Le Monde [2022], a 50 per cent increase in the volume of Algerian exports is envisaged (Algeria’s share currently represents between 8 per cent and 9 per cent of gas supplies to France). Other than energy, the meeting addressed migration and security issues. President Macron promised Algerian President Tebboune to increase the delivery of French visas to Algerian students and artists, while security cooperation on the Sahel is also envisaged. In a context where France has withdrawn its military operations in the Sahel region, Algeria is considered by Paris as a key partner to maintain a certain level of influence in the region. France’s closeness to Algeria has in turn impacted Franco-Moroccan relations as Paris made clear it has no intention to change its neutral position toward Western Sahara.

Beyond France, Morocco also has a new challenge in its quest for regional recognition of its sovereignty over Western Sahara. In August 2022, Tunisia received the leader of the Polisario Front, Brahim Ghali, for the 8th Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) [Sahara Press Service 2022]. During the visit, Ghali was presented by Tunisian authorities as a Head of State which provoked a diplomatic crisis between Tunisia and Morocco. After Ghali’s visit, both countries recalled their respective ambassadors. The latest diplomatic crisis between Morocco and Tunisia dates back to 1960, when the then Tunisian President Bourguiba recognized Mauritania, a Moroccan former colony. Since then, Tunis has always had a «neutral position» ¶{p. 53}regarding the Western Sahara issue and still officially recognises the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Tunisia’s position was clear already in October 2021 when it voted against the prolongation of the MINURSO mandate within the UN Security Council together with Russia, in opposition to 13 other countries which voted to renew the mandate for another year [Security Council Report 2021]. Tunisia’s move was then followed by an official visit by its president Kaied Saïd to Algeria. In Algiers, Saïd and Algerian President Tebboune underlined the need to build close relations between the two countries, while Tebboune expressed Algeria’s willingness to send financial aid to Tunis.

Other than Western Sahara, the energy sector and new impulses to shorten supply chains to relaunch Euro-Mediterranean integration following the pandemic and the war in Ukraine are also emerging as areas of competition between Morocco and Algeria. While Europe is trying to diversify its energy supply from Russia, North African countries are investing time and money in massive pipeline projects as well as new industrial poles for the production of electric vehicles and renewable energy [Wenger 2022]. In July 2022, Algeria, Nigeria and Niger signed the agreement protocol for the formalization of the Trans-Saharan pipeline (TSGP). The pipeline, called Nigal, has been discussed since the 1980s and should transport 30 billion cubic metres (bcm) of gas from Nigeria and Niger to Algeria a year. In parallel, Morocco and Nigeria stated that they are willing to prolong the West African Gas Pipeline from Nigeria to Morocco. This pipeline, already in operation, distributes Nigerian gas to Benin, Togo and Ghana. From a temporal and funding perspective, the Algerian project seems more solid: it is shorter, the pipeline should be ready before the Moroccan one which is envisaged to be operational by 2046, and its costs are more contained (13 billion dollars against 25 billion for the Morocco-Nigeria project) [Wenger 2022]. That said, from a security perspective, the feasibility of the Algeria project is more challenging: the pipeline would cross areas in which the jihadist group Boko Haram is active and Niger where other jihadist groups challenge the stability of the entire region [Wenger 2022]. As a result, both projects may face critical challenges in attracting funding, not least in light of their environmental impact and current decarbonization pledges in Europe and the US. Europe’s need for energy and its recognition of natural gas as ¶{p. 54}a «transition energy» may bring the European Investment Fund to partially support both projects. Nevertheless, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the new deals signed to deliver Algerian gas to Europe, along with renewed momentum to develop and expand LNG terminals in Congo, Mauritania and Senegal, mean that Africa may in principle supply an extra 30 bcm to Europe in 2030 [IEA 2022].