The renewed engagements with the Assad regime can indeed be considered part of broader realignments that have taken place across the region involving Turkey, Israel, Egypt, the Emirates and Saudi Arabia. These states had been at loggerheads since the outbreak of the 2011 Arab uprisings due to Turkey’s (and Qatar’s) support for the Muslim Brotherhood in various Arab countries while the Gulf States and Israel promoted counter-revolutions in the region, beginning with Egypt in 2013 [Dessì 2021]. Having launched a hesitant reconciliation process with the Emirates and Saudi Arabia in 2021, Turkey has progressed further down the road of rapprochement in 2022, as witnessed by the exchange of ambassadors with Israel [Al Jazeera 2022g], the multiple high-level visits with the Emirates [Reuters 2022f] and Saudi Arabia [Reuters 2022f; Al Jazeera 2022a] and the meeting on the sidelines of the Qatar World Cup between Erdogan and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in December [Ertan 2022; Jabbour 2022]. Driven by Turkey’s increased isolation and economic troubles at home in the run-up to elections, this Arab-Turkish-Israeli reconciliation process is positive in terms of dampening tensions in the Near East. Yet there remain many unknowns and it is too early to tell if such efforts can be sustained. This is particularly true in light of the ongoing tensions over Eastern Mediterranean gas and maritime exploration rights, which have renewed tensions between Turkey and Greece, as well as disagreements with Egypt over Libya. Here, Ankara signed another controversial gas exploration deal with the Tripoli government in October, which has significantly angered the EU, Greece and Egypt [Euractiv and Agence France-Presse 2022]. The re-election of Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel and the increased violence and repression carried out by the Israeli army in the occupied Palestinian territories could also lead to renewed tensions between Tel Aviv and Ankara. President Erdogan’s traditional support for the Palestinian cause, combined with the new Israeli government’s provocative actions and rhetoric, particularly vis-à-vis the Muslim holy sites in occupied East Jerusalem, could well re-ignite the flames of conflict, with likely reverberations extending to Turkey-Israel relations. ¶{p. 41}

Aside from these broader developments, Syria’s future perspective appears uncertain. On the positive side, the ongoing rapprochement with the Arab countries and potentially with Turkey could help the Syrian economy and alleviate the humanitarian crisis, although there will be no accountability for crimes committed. On the other, Syria’s close association with Moscow and Tehran are likely to lead to a continuation of EU and US sanctions and political isolation, while the future status of Syria’s North-Eastern regions and the Syrian Kurds remains uncertain.

Developments in this area will likely depend on the extent of the Turkey-Syria rapprochement, but under most scenarios the Syrian Kurds do not appear to have a bright future, caught between a returning Syrian regime, an increasingly militarised Turkish policy and the legacy of abandonment by the US and its Western allies. Meanwhile, Israel has continued its military raids in the country to target Iranian or Syrian assets, including the international airport in Damascus, which was targeted on several occasions during 2022 in an effort to prevent arms deliveries or support for the Lebanese group Hezbollah.

Whether and to what extent Syria will be reintegrated into the Arab political context remains to be seen. Considering ongoing US opposition to any reconstruction of Syria, concrete benefits will likely take time to materialise. Moreover, the multiple external actors still involved in Syria – Russia, Iran, the US and Turkey – all have a stake in facilitating or preventing improvements on the ground and each is ultimately driven by diverging interests. For this reason, it seems likely that much of the future prospects of reconciliation and improvements on the ground will not only depend on the Assad regime or its Arab and Turkish neighbours, but also on the broader contours of Arab-Iranian-Turkish relations. Should the near future witness a significant exacerbation of regional and international tensions over Iran, it is likely that Syria – as well as Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq and possibly Palestine – will be dragged into the storm, with significant implications for the broader region and EU and US interests therein.

The example of Iraq is significant in this regard. Developments over the past year – and especially the severe political crisis that has evolved since the country’s last elections in October 2021 – demonstrate the extent of Iranian influence over the country’s disparate political groups as well as the broader dysfunctions of ¶{p. 42}the Iraqi state and political elites. On several occasions during the year Iraq took steps towards a return to internal conflict, with the crux of the crisis revolving around intra-Shia rivalries pitting a group of Iran-aligned parties against the largest force in the Iraqi parliament led by Muqtadar Al-Sadr which promotes Iraqi nationalism and independence from both the US and Iran. Tensions exacerbated after months of political tensions when Al-Sadr was blocked from forming a majority government after the October vote, leading ultimately to his unilateral decision to withdraw his parliamentarians in June 2022 [Al Jazeera 2022f]. However, his hopes of attracting greater support failed, as the vacant parliamentary seats were promptly filled by his political rivals. In response, Al-Sadr upped the ante further, twice calling on his followers to storm the heavily fortified diplomatic zone in Baghdad and occupy parliament in July and August, but again to no avail. Ultimately, by September, it became apparent that Al-Sadr had grossly miscalculated, effectively sacrificing his political influence in parliament for little or no gain [Al Jazeera 2022e]. Indeed, after having recalled his followers from parliament in August, Sadr announced his withdrawal from politics, leaving his political opponents to form a new government, announced in late October 2022 and led by Mohammed Shia al-Sudani [The Guardian 2022]. Like Syria and Lebanon, Iraq remains highly exposed to broader forces in the region, and its future – including those efforts to promote intra-regional reconciliation and rapprochement via the convening of the second Baghdad Conference in December 2022 in Amman – will likely depend on developments surrounding Iran. Should the worst expectations of a new period of conflict with Tehran materialize internationally and within the region, Iraq will be sure to suffer as a front-line Arab state whose deep internal fragilities and fragmentation make it exposed to the meddling of multiple actors within and beyond the MENA region itself [13] . ¶{p. 43}

Turning to North Africa, this section will begin with a brief overview of Tunisia’s ongoing democratic backsliding, before turning to address the ongoing fragmentation in Libya following the postponement of national elections originally scheduled for December 2021. A final section will then assess recent developments in Morocco and Algeria, against the backdrop of ongoing tensions over Western Sahara.

Between August 2021 and December 2022, Tunisia’s fragile democracy continued to suffer due to President Kais Saïed’s consolidation of power and efforts to reduce the independence of parliament and the judiciary. In August 2021, President Saïed, elected in 2019, extended his unilateral suspension of parliament indefinitely, thus initiating a real reversal of the democratic process initiated in 2011 when former President Ben Ali was ousted by mass protests. The suspension of parliament was followed by the arrest of public officials and former ministers (especially members of the mildly-Islamist Ennahda party) on alleged charges of corruption or abuse of power. A month later, in September 2021, Saïed announced his plan to reform the constitution through a tightly controlled referendum. The Constitution had been adopted by Tunisia’s National Constituent Assembly in January 2014 after a two-year-long inclusive and transparent process and contained strong human rights safeguards. Saïed’s reform drive was harshly criticised by Tunisia’s powerful labour union, the UGTT, as well as civil society and political parties throughout the whole of 2022.

Internationally, the United States urged a swift return to parliamentary democracy in August 2021 while, in an unprecedented move, G7 ambassadors urged the Tunisian president on 7 September to quickly appoint a new head of government and return to «constitutional order, in which an elected parliament plays a significant role». The EU parliament, meanwhile, passed a resolution calling for the swift return to «full-fledged democ¶{p. 44}racy», urging Saïed to «engage in an inclusive national dialogue» on 21 October 2022. Despite mounting international criticism and mass protests, in July 2022, Tunisia held its controversial constitutional referendum. The low turnout (officially 30.5 per cent) highlighted the lack of popular support for the move, even though 94 per cent of voters supported the reform. Once approved, the new constitution introduced a presidential regime and a bicameral legislative system, effectively granting President Saiëd unchecked powers, especially over the judiciary.