For more information on the Black Sea Grain Initiative see, UNCTAD [2022].

The list excludes Syria due to lack of data. See, Belhaj et al. [2022,10].

While the maritime deal is by no means a step towards a full normalisation of Israeli-Lebanese relations, the agreement can be framed as part of the broader process that has informed the Abraham Accords, promoting economic integration as a means to help stabilise the region around a close knit grouping of states centred on the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, Jordan and Israel while again sidestepping the occupation of Palestine. See Harb [2022].

Particularly in the wake of repeated drone and missile attacks reportedly carried out by the Houthi rebels on Emirati targets from Yemen during the early months of 2022. See Al Jazeera [2022i]; Al Jazeera [2022d].

For a comprehensive timeline of the Iran nuclear negotiations see, Arms Control Association [2023]; also see, International Crisis Group [2022e].

For a comprehensive analysis of Houthi drone and missile attacks in the Arabian Peninsula see, ACLED [2023].

On the Iranian economy in 2022 see, Rome [2022].

On tanker seizures see, International Crisis Group [n.a.].

On the MENA region’s progress on Agenda 2030 see, Sustainable Development Report [n.a].

Areas outside Damascus’s control include: (a) North-Western Syria, the Idlib governorate’s western territories, which are controlled by the Islamist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham rebel group; (b) the diverse Northern territories occupied by Turkey (from the district of Afrin and parts of the Northern Aleppo governorate to the area between Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ain east of the Euphrates River); (c) North-Eastern Syria, economically the richest zone of the country, essentially controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – an alliance of Kurds and local Arabs in which the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) have in fact the upper hand – and backed by a residual force of US troops. Other areas include the enclave of Tanf at the juncture of the Syrian, Jordanian and Iraqi border, occupied by a US garrison and their local proxies. In other localities, such as the Badia Desert, where ISIS is still active, and in Southern Syria, between the Golan and Deir az-Zor, where divergences with Russian and local groups, effective regime control remains limited. See Al-Hajj [2021]; Tokmajyan [2021b].

«… estimated at $300 billion with a drop of about 40 per cent in GDP» Kaduri and Essa [2022], data reported in the above come from the same authors.

The current extension ends on 10 January 2023, with efforts already underway to renew the extension but concern that Russia may again politicise the vote. See Middle East Online [2022].

On Iraq see: Higel [2022]; Fantappie [2022].

For an overview of Fathi Bashagha’s political profile see Winer [2022].

For a detailed examination of the new dualism see International Crisis Group [2022d].