Mediterranean Economies 2023
DOI: 10.1401/9788815411167/c8
From what we have
presented so far, human mobility is clearly a complex
phenomenon. Assuming that environmental/climate changes, by the
simple fact that they occur, will automatically lead to mass
migration fails to consider the full spectrum of determinants in
migration decisions. Such decisions, which are ultimately taken
by the individual and/or the family, as indicated in the 2011
Foresight Report, are influenced by five general kinds of
motives:
¶{p. 272}
– economic
motives, or monetary gains accruing to migrants, by moving from
their place of origin to their final destination;
– political
motives, associated with situations linked to conflict,
security, discrimination and persecution in the migrant’s place
of origin;
– demographic
motives, associated with population expansion as well as
diseases that affect the morbidity and mortality rate in the
migrant’s place of origin;
– social motives,
associated with family reunification and the pursuit of better
education for themselves and the members of the migrant’s
family;
– environmental
motives, associated with human or natural disasters in the
migrant’s place of origin.
Therefore, it
seems important to highlight another major issue concerning the
environmental theme and its myths. In particular, the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change [United Nations, n.a.,
art. 2] defines climate change as «a change in climate due to
direct or indirect human activity that alters the global
atmosphere along with natural variation in climate». The
emphasis is on increased emissions of
CO2 and other greenhouse
gases that subsequently alter the atmosphere’s radiative
properties, resulting in warming of the climate system [IPCC 2021]
[4]
. Hence climate change refers specifically to the
rise in global temperatures. Throughout history, climate has
continually changed, but this change occurred naturally and at a
slower pace [Venditto 2021]. What we are currently observing is
an era of anthropogenic climate change.
This is
corroborated by research [NASA n.a.] which indicates that the
changes are occurring at a much faster rate as a result of human
activity, like burning fossil fuels such as natural gas, oil and
coal. NASA’s analysis revealed that the decade 2010-20 was the
hottest since records began in 1880, with 2020 the hottest year
ever recorded, and that ocean temperatures were the highest they
have ever been [NASA n.a.].
Carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gas emissions are known to be the main sources
of this global warming. Indeed, ¶{p. 273}there
is a broad consensus among scientists and scholars that human
activities are causing the environment to change rapidly for the
worse [Hausfather 2017; Abhinav, Arjun and Simi 2020; [National
Academies 2020].
At the same time,
over the last decade, scholars and policy makers have started to
pay more attention to the impact of climate change on human
mobility [Traore and Ionesco 2018; Šedová, ¥izmaziová and Cook
2021]. The 2010 Cancun Adaptation Framework is the first major
climate policy document which refers to human mobility
associated to climate change-induced displacement, human
mobility and planned relocation [Warner 2021]. However,
depending on the economic and socio-political conditions in the
respective regions of origin, the connection between climate
change and mobility is not always very well expounded.
The climate
change-human mobility nexus is generally presented using
sensational and alarming predictions, promoting fear-based
stories of waves of climate migrants forced to move from their
place of residence [Myers 2002; Henley 2020] ultimately landing
in Europe and North America [Lustgarten 2020]. These
predictions, although well intentioned and aimed at educating
about the impact of climate change and promoting structural and
humanitarian interventions, may have the opposite result in
terms of unintended effects, especially in Europe, and elsewhere
where nationalist/populist movements have been emerging very
strongly, and where the fear of environmentally induced mobility
is used to promote restrictive migration policies or boost
parties’ political agenda [Trilling 2020].
Furthermore, as
indicated by several authors [McAuliff and Triandafyllidou 2021;
Cattaneo and Peri 2016; Kleemans 2015], mobility in the event of
an adverse climatic occurrence depends on the personal wealth of
the affected individuals. For this very same reason, while
acknowledging that climate change exists, it is hard to predict
the size of the migration movement it can generate. What is
clear is that environmentally induced migration, particularly
sudden-onset events [Alarina 2018], generally echoes the same
pattern of all other forms of migration. Such displacement is
mostly internal or follows a regional/continental route.
Moreover, rarely do environmental migrants move large
distances/intra-continentally. This observation is reinforced by
Cattaneo ¶{p. 274}and Peri’s observation that
environmentally induced movements depend on the initial level of
income of the affected individuals. Although movements are hard
to predict, one trend is however apparent: people do move to
urban areas. In 2020 at least 2.59 billion people lived in
metropolises with more than 300,000 inhabitants representing
approximately 60 per cent of the world’s urban population.
Urbanization has been most pronounced in those countries below
the Brandt line (fig. 1)
[5]
, especially in Asia and Oceania, which saw the
urbanization rate increase from 43.1 in 2010 to 49.8 per cent in
2020 [UNDESA 2019; UNCTAD 2021].
According to the
various, more or less pessimistic, scenarios proposed, global
warming has had and will continue to have a serious impact on
the livelihoods of those based in Mediterranean countries,
particularly in the West Asia and Nord African (WANA) region,
potentially intensifying already substantial human mobility.
However, as
already indicated when describing the different motives leading
to migratory movements and the way in which there are entangled,
it is not easy to pinpoint the specific contribution that
environmental/climate changes will have on migration. What makes
it more difficult is the fact that, at present, there is no
single definition of environmental/climate migrants commonly
accepted at international level. This means that quantification
differs according to the definition adopted. Of course, the
broader, but also less accurate and verifiable, the definition,
the larger is the number of migrants that can be associated with
the status of environmental/climate migrants [Caruso and
Venditto 2011]. In the absence of an unambiguous definition,
following the general view among academics/scholars of the
discipline, consensus is often achieved on the use of the
broadest notion of induced/forced
migration, where the main elements are the
motivations that «force» people to move, and not national
boundaries. A variety of socio-economic factors, which result in
a state of necessity that forces mobility, are considered the
reasons that lead to such movement, together with significant
environmental degradation factors. ¶{p. 275}
¶
In this
perspective, the definition of forced migration used here
includes the following categories:
– migrants and
IDPs, obliged to leave due to a fast-changing habitat, climate
change or environmental disasters caused either by natural
disasters or by human actions;
– migrants and
IDPs, displaced as a result of the implementation of economic
development programmes, such as the construction of major
infrastructure projects, exploitation of mineral resources and
deforestation;
– political
refugees, asylum seekers, subject to displacement due to
conflicts, civil wars, persecutions [Caruso and Venditto 2012].
This definition is
in line with that used by the IOM which describes
environmental/climate migrants as:
persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment that adversely affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad [IOM 2017, 1].
The development
and implementation of policies to reduce people’s exposure to
environmental/climate shocks while stimulating economic growth
and reducing the risk of political instability will prevent the
likelihood of further migration movements.
Furthermore, it
should not be forgotten that the nature and extent of migration
strongly depend not only on the factors that cause displacements
but are also influenced by the migration policies that are
implemented by both the countries of origin and destination.
Finally, it is
worth pointing out that migrant behaviour, when influenced by
environment or climate, is infinitely more complex than one can
«theoretically» imagine. In many cases, the decision to migrate,
the timing, duration and destination can, in fact, be determined
directly by the migrants, taking into account the costs of
migration but also the «sentimental ties with the place».
Indirectly, the decision to move can also be influenced by the
policies put in place by the national and local institutions to
support the groups/communities/area affected by different forms
of degradation (environmental, economic, political, etc.).
Mobility can generally be characterised by successive phases,
¶{p. 277}determined by multi-causal factors.
Indeed, as can be seen, both from observations and from the
intersection of the different data on the countries of the MENA
region, land degradation can increase, for example, rural to
urban migration, with people moving away from the area of origin
hoping to diversify their sources of income. If the employment
opportunities in urban areas remain insufficient and the
prospective migrant family (or sometimes the community)
possesses or can raise the necessary resources and can count on
a social network in the destination country, migration to other
countries/areas can be considered a viable option. In this case,
we are facing a cumulative process that combines a
socio-economic and environmental dynamic, but we may also
observe a form of step migration with internal migration turning
into international. Ultimately, therefore, it seems very
important to consider the environment/climate – migration nexus
in a broader perspective through a multidisciplinary approach
that can grasp the complexity resulting from the many underlying
variables.
Note
[4] Other human activities influencing climate include the emission of aerosols and other short-lived climate forcers, and land-use change such as urbanisation, [IPCC 2021].
[5] The Brandt Line provides a visualization of the divide between the wealthy global North and poorer global South, highlighting the disparities and inequalities between the two parts [Lees 2021, 85-106].