Mediterranean Economies 2023
DOI: 10.1401/9788815411167/c8
Finally, it is
worth pointing out that migrant behaviour, when influenced by
environment or climate, is infinitely more complex than one can
«theoretically» imagine. In many cases, the decision to migrate,
the timing, duration and destination can, in fact, be determined
directly by the migrants, taking into account the costs of
migration but also the «sentimental ties with the place».
Indirectly, the decision to move can also be influenced by the
policies put in place by the national and local institutions to
support the groups/communities/area affected by different forms
of degradation (environmental, economic, political, etc.).
Mobility can generally be characterised by successive phases,
¶{p. 277}determined by multi-causal factors.
Indeed, as can be seen, both from observations and from the
intersection of the different data on the countries of the MENA
region, land degradation can increase, for example, rural to
urban migration, with people moving away from the area of origin
hoping to diversify their sources of income. If the employment
opportunities in urban areas remain insufficient and the
prospective migrant family (or sometimes the community)
possesses or can raise the necessary resources and can count on
a social network in the destination country, migration to other
countries/areas can be considered a viable option. In this case,
we are facing a cumulative process that combines a
socio-economic and environmental dynamic, but we may also
observe a form of step migration with internal migration turning
into international. Ultimately, therefore, it seems very
important to consider the environment/climate – migration nexus
in a broader perspective through a multidisciplinary approach
that can grasp the complexity resulting from the many underlying
variables.
2. Forced migration: data and scenarios
Beyond any
categorization, it can be said without a doubt that the forced
migration issue addressed is much broader and more complex than
appears at first instance, manifesting itself in a widespread
way both along the timeline and in global space. In this regard,
the most recent data provided by the UNHCR, the UN Refugee
Agency, relating to global trends on forced displacement bear
witness to what has been stated (fig. 2). In particular, by the
end of 2021, continuing a worrying decade-long rising trend, the
number of people forced to flee had climbed to 89.3 million.
This is more than double the 42.7 million who remained forcibly
displaced at the end of 2012 and represents a sharp 8 per cent
increase of almost seven million people in the span of just 12
months.
During 2021, some
1.7 million people crossed international borders seeking
protection and 14.4 million new displacements within their
countries were reported [IDCM 2021]. Internal displacement was
markedly higher in 2021 than in recent years, while those
crossing borders seeking protection remained muted
¶{p. 278}compared to pre-pandemic levels as
health-related border and travel restrictions remained in effect
in many locations.
On the other hand,
most countries that remained closed to those seeking
international protection at the end of 2021, rather than keep
their asylum systems completely closed, introduced some adaptive
elements which improved access to varying degrees
[6]
.
The year was
perhaps most notable for the number of existing conflicts that
escalated and new conflicts that flared up. According to the
World Bank, 23 countries, with a combined population of 850
million people, faced high- or medium-intensity conflict in
2021. In Afghanistan, the events leading up to the Taliban
takeover of Kabul in August 2021 resulted in displacement within
the country as well as into neighbouring countries. The number
of people displaced internally rose for the 15th straight year,
even as more than 790,000 Afghans returned during the year. The
conflict in the Tigray region in Ethiopia led to at least 2.5
million more people being displaced within their country, with
some 1.5 million of them returning to their homes during the
year. Violent insurgencies in the Central Sahel region of Africa
continued to drive internal displacement, particularly in
Burkina Faso. In Myanmar, the military takeover in February 2021
ignited widespread violence and forced many people to flee. With
renewed displacement from Venezuela, primarily to other Latin
American countries, the number of Venezuelans displaced abroad
also grew by more than half a million. In addition, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, South Sudan, Sudan,
the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen all saw increases of between
100,000 and 500,000 people displaced internally during the year.
¶{p. 279}
¶
The climate crisis
is making the humanitarian situation even worse. With regard
specifically to the MENA region it is true that the
deterioration of the natural system, co-existing with a status
of diffuse poverty and social tension, of poor governance, and
the presence of current and potential new conflicts, could
create a «vicious circle» of migration. Environment/climate
changes, however, rather than produce mass international
migration towards Western countries, will probably reinforce the
existing migratory patterns. Based on the current pattern of
migration, it is also likely that much of the migration, and
particularly that which could be directly attributed to
environmental/climate change, will remain within the region as
has happened in the past, and/or assume the form of internal
(rural-rural, rural-urban) migration.
In this context,
it is impossible to overlook the recent events concerning the
war in Ukraine that broke out in February 2022: from 24 February
to 29 May 2022, 6.8 million refugee movements out of Ukraine
were recorded, while 2.2 million population movements into
Ukraine were recorded during the same period, including those of
a pendular nature [UNHCR n.a. a; UNHCR n.a. b]. It is one of the
largest forced displacement crises since World War II, and
certainly the fastest. It should be remembered that refugees
fleeing Ukraine are hosted by predominantly high-income European
countries. They have also been offered temporary protection
status by European Union Member States, with more than 2.8
million refugees having registered for such schemes. With
millions of Ukrainians displaced and further displacement
elsewhere in 2022, total forced
displacement now exceeds 100 million people. This means that one
in every 78 people on earth has been forced to flee – a dramatic
milestone whereby many of the 36.2 million refugees, asylum
seekers and others forced to flee across borders who had already
been displaced by the end of 2021 faced conditions that were
much more dire, with women and children disproportionately
exposed to deep-rooted discrimination and extreme vulnerability
[7]
.¶{p. 281}
2.1. Displaced women’s struggle against socio-economic inequalities
Following two decades of progress – including a
decline from over 9.5 per cent in 2016 to 8.4 per
cent in 2019 – global poverty rose in 2020 and 2021,
with the pandemic-related economic downturn pushing
100 million or more people into extreme poverty,
exacerbating existing inequalities [World Bank
2022]. In particular, during the pandemic the
socio-economic well-being of both forcibly displaced
and host populations deteriorated in most countries.
Both populations have lost assets, savings, income
and access to basic services, and many are severely
food-insecure. If the conditions of host communities
vary widely, even among refugees the incidence of
poverty may vary widely by country of origin,
household size, education level, arrival date,
gender and other factors. In this regard, while the
lack of comprehensive data precludes regional or
global estimates at this time, existing
country-specific studies provide an early indication
of the poverty levels and the impacts of some
variables upon them.
Among
such studies it is worth mentioning the Gender
Dimensions of Forced Displacement (GDFD) research
programme, promoted by the World Bank, with support
from the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development
Office. To uncover gender-poverty links among forced
displaced people, nine detailed country
investigations and three multi-country papers
covering 17 countries were produced [Klugman 2022].
Findings from multi-country studies of
multidimensional poverty covering Ethiopia, Nigeria,
Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan, and monetary poverty
analysis in Somalia and Jordan, indicate that
households of displaced people are generally poorer
than non-displaced households. The gender of the
household head was an indicator of deprivation in
most, but not all, countries under investigation.
Within
households, gender emerged as an important
predictive factor of a higher Multidimensional
Poverty Index (MPI) and an indicator of chronic
deprivation, such as school completion. Among the
multidimensionally poor, girls were, indeed, less
likely than boys to complete school.
Differences were also evident among IDPs and
non-IDPs pertaining to indicators of monetary
poverty, and many of the differences in income
poverty risk were associated with
diffe
¶{p. 282}rences in household
demographic characteristics and the gender and
number of earners in the household. These, in turn,
are often associated with displacement-related
changes in household composition and gender roles.
Evidence from all the countries investigated
demonstrated that substantial barriers constrain the
economic opportunities of displaced women, most
notably in the form of limited education and care
responsibilities. For example, among Ethiopian
refugees, the livelihoods of men and women were
impacted differently by displacement, in part
because adverse gender norms result in women having
fewer opportunities for economic advancement and
bearing more care responsibilities at home.
Note
[6] In 2021, more than two-thirds (69 per cent) of all refugees and those displaced abroad came from just five countries. Syrian Arab Republic (6.8 million), Venezuela (4.6 million), Afghanistan (2.7 million), South Sudan (2.4 million) and Myanmar (1.2 million). Low- and middle-income countries hosted 83 per cent of the world’s refugees displaced abroad while the least developed countries provided asylum to 27 per cent of the total; 72 per cent are hosted in neighbouring countries. Turkey hosted nearly 3.8 million refugees, the largest population worldwide. Colombia was second with more than 1.8 million, followed by Uganda (1.5 million), Pakistan (1.5 million) and Germany (1.3 million). With regard to IDPs, the island of Aruba hosted the largest number of Venezuelans displaced abroad (1 in 6) while Lebanon received the largest number of refugees (1 in 8), followed by Curaçao (1 in 10), Jordan (1 in 14) and Turkey (1 in 23) [UNHCR 2022a, 2-3].
[7] Concerning demographics of people who have been forcibly displaced children account for 30 per cent of the world’s population, but 41 per cent of all forcibly displaced; among the latter, specifically considering age groups and gender, those in the 0-17 age group are 21 per cent male and 20 per cent female; the 18-59 age group is split 27 per cent male and 26 per cent female; those aged 60+ account for 3 per cent for both sexes [UNHCR cit., 3].