Mediterranean Economies 2023
DOI: 10.1401/9788815411167/c8
8.Forced migration and environmental
problems: challenges and perspectivesby Immacolata Caruso, Valentina Noviello and Bruno Venditto
Notizie Autori
Immacolata Caruso CNR-ISMed, National Research Council,
Institute for Studies on the Mediterranean (caruso@ismed.cnr.it).
Notizie Autori
Valentina Noviello CNR-ISMed, National Research Council,
Institute for Studies on the Mediterranean (noviello@ismed.cnr.it).
Notizie Autori
Bruno Venditto CNR-ISMed, National Research Council, Institute
for Studies on the Mediterranean (venditto@ismed.cnr.it).
Abstract
This subpart examines the
interconnection between external events like war and
climate change and their impact on human migration.
The aim is to deepen their relationship and to
understand how such movements could reinforce
existing inequalities or create new imbalances, with
a specific focus on the gender gap.
Introduction
The COVID-19 crisis
has led to unprecedented disruption to the healthcare system and
to economies and society, revealing the systemic fragility of
our world. More recently, the war in Ukraine has seen a return
to emergency conditions, causing a massive humanitarian crisis
while threatening the world’s recovery. The effects of these
geopolitical tensions have spread worldwide, and countries all
over the globe are facing further disruption due to rising food
and energy prices, inflationary pressures, disrupted supply
chains, financial turbulence and so forth, while there are
serious concerns that the plans to address climate change will
be slowed or even abandoned in some parts of the planet. In this
context, it is evident that conflicts and crises are increasing
worldwide and more people than ever are being displaced, with a
serious risk to their lives and future, and with a growing
number of women and children being affected.
Against this
background and such serious issues, we address the following
questions: Are the current migration policies, especially those
concerning forced migration, adequate to meet current challenges
and opportunities? What guidelines will policy makers follow at
European and global level if a clear framework for future
policies for conflict- and environment-induced forced migration
has not been properly laid down? Our contribution will thus
investigate the link between external events such as conflict
and climate change, and human mobility, while assessing how such
movements could reinforce existing inequalities or create new
imbalances, focusing especially on the gender gap. Moreover,
while there is substantial agreement among scientists and
scholars that climate is changing rapidly, the connections
¶{p. 268}between climate change and human
mobility are not always very well explained or understood.
Forced migration is
generally presented using sensationalistic and alarming
predictions, promoting fear-based stories of waves of
climate-induced migrants forced to relocate from their place of
residence, eventually disembarking in Europe and North America.
What is evident, however, is that people move, and will continue
to move, regardless of the flow control policies of individual
states.
After a brief
introduction providing the background to the study, the
theoretical approach used by the authors is presented to
describe the concept of induced human mobility seen primarily
from a perspective of social justice. The chapter will then go
on to analyse how international and EU policies have dealt with
and regulate the migratory flows associated with forced
migration, and to ascertain whether and to what extent such
policies are effectively able to regulate such a complex
phenomenon.
1. Theory and reality of forced migrations
Tackling and seeking
appropriate solutions to the impact of migration induced by
climate change and/or conflict upon development and,
correspondingly, upon the creation of new inequalities, means
thinking globally in order to act locally. The interdependence
between global and local events, and vice versa, is not a new
phenomenon. Since the 1960s, scholars have referred to «the
butterfly effect», to describe the complex
interdependence and absorptivity of state and sub-state borders
as regards the effects of events occurring in other, more
geographically remote parts of the world [Longo et
al. 2009]. Today these relationships have
become apparent to everyone, as shown by the recent events
related to the COVID-19 pandemic and the ongoing war in Ukraine.
The mix of global and local, «glocal», is
now also a mix of different decision-making actions, taken at
different levels, which make it difficult to identify who is
responsible for decisions, resulting in a complex multilevel
process made by countless policies.
In this context, in
Italy, and in the European Union in general, the concept of
public order and security has been incorporated into the
discourse on human mobility. Before the humanitarian crisis
¶{p. 269}caused by the war in Ukraine, migrants
were usually perceived according to a Eurocentric stereotypical
lens and/or a flawed representation of them [Flahaux and de Haas
2016; Hinojo n.a]. A simple quest for the word
migration on the main web
search engines, such as Google, Yahoo or Bing, leads to web
sites, news or academic articles referring to international
migration and/or movements from poor and/or war-torn areas to
Western countries, mainly in Europe. The images of Africans
climbing onto anti-immigration fences built on the
Moroccan-Spanish borders, or those of the migrants rescued in
the Mediterranean Sea on overcrowded boats, while trying to
reach Europe’s promised land, are some of the examples that
capture the attention of the media [Euronews 2014; Baratta
2016]. Based on this narrative of migration, particularly in the
last two decades, human mobility has been analysed in order to
find solutions to the supposed threats that such migratory
movements could cause in opulent Western Europe [Flahaux and de
Haas 2016; Caruso and Venditto 2013].
On the other hand,
mobility, beyond its multiple motivations, whether economic,
environmental or conflict-induced, has often been viewed mainly
from an international and intercontinental perspective rather
than an internal and interregional one. Internal migration has
not received the same level of attention, often being analysed
primarily as a domestic affair of developing nations associated
to events of crisis, such as war or famine. Concurrently, and
instrumental to the above positions, the discourse on human
mobility has shifted to how migrating individuals might be
classified. Commonly used terms include economic migrants
(contract/migrant workers, labour migrants, skilled
professionals), refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced
persons (IDPs), and, more recently, environmental or
climate-induced migrants [Wacker, Becker and Crepaz 2019; Fasani
2016; Laczko and Aghazarm 2009]. Such categories are used to
assist host governments in regulating and controlling human
mobility and selecting who should be entitled to protection and
assistance. In our view these categories create a false
separation among migrants which does little to explain,
understand or address the migration phenomenon. Our perspective,
in line with a growing literature [Betts 2010; Crawley and
Skleparis 2018; Foster 2007; Elliott 2018; Pijnenburg and Rijken
2021], goes beyond such categories and looks at migration
holistically as a fundamental human rights
issue.¶{p. 270}
Migration has
undoubtedly increased in intensity in recent decades [UNDESA
2020]: looking at international migration for which data are
easily available, in 2020 there were more than 280 million
international migrants. However, when global population growth
is factored in, the number appears less daunting, given that,
from 1970 to 2020, the proportion of migrants in the world’s
population increased by only 1.3 percentage points, from 2.3 to
3.6 per cent [UNDESA 2021; McAuliffe and Triandafyllidou 2021].
On the other hand,
determining the size of internal migration is no easy task
because of the non-availability of reliable data. Bell and
Muhidin [2009] were the first in the last two decades to
comprehensively analyse internal migration flows. They were able
to provide a rough approximation of the global scale of internal
migration, suggesting that, «at the turn of the millennium, in
the world as a whole, some 740 million people were living within
their home country but outside their region of birth» [Bell and
Muhidin 2009, 55]. Bell and Charles-Edwards [2013], using a much
broader sample of 70 countries extracted from the data set on
the project Comparing Internal Migration Around the Globe (IMAGE)
[1]
, revised the previous figure upwards, raising to 763
million the number of people living in their home country but
outside their region/area of birth
[2]
. This figure should include IDPs whose number
increased more than tenfold between 1993 and 2019 [IDCM 2021].
Thus, if we look at
the number of migrants worldwide, there is no doubt that those
who moved while remaining within the borders of their country,
are part of what has been an even more massive global migration
phenomenon. Furthermore, internal mobility, including IDPs, is
quite significant for the purposes of our analysis since the
definition of IDPs includes those movements caused by natural or
human-induced environmental/climate change and most of the time
such movements occur inside the country affected by the change
in question.¶{p. 271}
Year |
Number
of International Migrants |
Migrants as % of world’s
population |
1970 |
84,460,125
|
2.3 |
1975 |
90,368,010
|
2.2 |
1980 |
101,983,149
|
2.3 |
1985 |
113,206,691
|
2.3 |
1990 |
152,986,157
|
2.9 |
1995 |
161,289,976
|
2.8 |
2000 |
173,230,585
|
2.8 |
2005 |
191,446,828
|
2.9 |
2010 |
220,983,187
|
3.2 |
2015 |
247,958,644
|
3.4 |
2020 |
280,598,105
|
3.6 |
Source:
UNDESA 2008; UNDESA 2021. |
Most environmental
migrants come within the IDP category which encompasses those
who:
…have been forced, or obliged to leave their habitual residence as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border. [African Union 2009, 3].
Moreover, there is
a clear convergence and overlap between conflicts and disaster
areas even if, as exposed by McAuliffe and Triandafyllidou
[2021], in recent years many more people have been displaced due
to disasters than conflict and violence, and many more countries
are affected by disaster displacement
[3]
.
From what we have
presented so far, human mobility is clearly a complex
phenomenon. Assuming that environmental/climate changes, by the
simple fact that they occur, will automatically lead to mass
migration fails to consider the full spectrum of determinants in
migration decisions. Such decisions, which are ultimately taken
by the individual and/or the family, as indicated in the 2011
Foresight Report, are influenced by five general kinds of
motives:
¶{p. 272}
Note
[1] In 2013 Image had data on population census for the years 1999, 2000 and 2010 when available, from 179 countries. The 70 countries selected by Bell and Charles-Edwards represented 71 per cent of the total population in 2010, with a full coverage of countries in all continents (16 countries in Africa, 25 in Asia, 10 in Europe, 23 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 3 in North America and 3 in Oceania).
[2] This meant that nearly 12 per cent of the world’s population in the year 2010 was made of internal migrants.
[3] In 2020 new displacements occurred 144 times due to disasters compared to 42 times due to conflict and violence.