Finally, the Russian invasion of Ukraine also provided newfound political leverage for key energy exporting states in the region. This was promptly used to deflect residual criticism surrounding human rights or authoritarian consolidation at home. European states in particular rushed to the region for alternative energy resources to diversify from Russia, agreeing to revise previous bans on weapons sales to Arab states in the Gulf in the process [Kadam 2022; Middle East Eye 2021]. New oil and gas deals were signed with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Qatar and the UAE throughout 2022, returning the MENA to some of its lost centrality in European energy markets.

Significantly, however, both Europe and the US failed to convince most MENA states, including closest allies in the Arabian Peninsula and Israel as well as NATO member Turkey, to fully align with the West’s policy of sanctioning Moscow. Neither did the US or Europe succeed in convincing Saudi Arabia and other OPEC members to increase oil production to stabilise global energy prices.

Instead, after having rebuffed US and EU requests on multiple occasions [Nussbaum and Nereim 2022; Westall and MacDonald 2022], Saudi Arabia actually joined Russia and the OPEC+ grouping to cut back oil output in October 2022, sending a stern message of independence to their primary security benefactor in the US [Klippenstein 2022; Reuters 2022e]. While a number of MENA states did vote to condemn Russia at the UN (with the ¶{p. 31}exception of Syria which has backed Russia in all resolutions), most states – and particularly the GCC countries – chose to abstain, while only Morocco (and Turkey) have provided Ukraine with military support [Patkin, Yavorsky, Almaari et al. 2022; Schaer 2022]. Explained by the broad trade interests that tie a number of these states to Russia as well as the driving priority of energy exporters to maximise returns from the present high prices, the deeper significance relates to the emergence of a more multipolar Middle East.

Multipolarity is reflected in the West’s declining leverage across the region and the increased tendency for independent action displayed by a network of rising and increasingly integrated regional powers. The increased penetration of both Russia and China has meanwhile diluted the West’s influence over regional dynamics, with MENA states increasingly balancing relations with both East and West. Driven by a widespread belief that the US is no longer willing to shoulder major security burdens in the MENA, US President Biden’s promise that the «US will not walk away» [Ravid 2022] from the Middle East during his much anticipated July 2022 trip to Israel and the Arabian Peninsula did little to assuage concern over a supposed US «retrenchment» from the region. The chaotic images of the US and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, combined with the US’s reluctance to more forcibly support Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the context of the war in Yemen [4] , have reinforced this perception further. Indeed, 2022 would also witness a sustained crisis in the bilateral US-Saudi relationship, after Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman refused to assist Washington in its efforts to stabilise global energy prices [Hamid 2022; Porter 2022]. The growing multipolarity of the region was displayed further in early December 2022 in the context of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Saudi Arabia to attend the 1st China-GCC Summit [Xinhua Net 2022]. The visit was quickly contrasted with the more frosty reception received by President Biden only months prior, while the signing of multiple energy, telecommunications (including with the US-sanctioned Chinese company Huawei [Al Jazeera ¶{p. 32}2022b]) and even security deals underscored Saudi Arabia’s and the Emirate’s interest in exploring multiple cooperation frameworks with China, even at the cost of angering the US [Al Jazeera 2022a; Miller 2022].

Developments surrounding Iran took a decisive turn for the worse over the past year. The Vienna negotiations mediated by the EU to bring both Tehran and Washington back to full compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) had progressed through fits and starts throughout most of 2021, leading in December and January 2022 to the eighth round of talks to revive the 2015 Iran nuclear deal [5] . With the start of the new year, momentum seemed positive as the sides slowly worked through their respective demands and appeared to be nearing a compromise, though significant divisions remained [Reuters 2022c].

By February and March 2022 pessimism over the JCPOA’s future returned with a vengeance.

Iran continued to upgrade and advance its nuclear programme, while the US refused to limit sanctions and the IAEA and Europe sought renewed assurances and intrusive inspections in Iran as well as the continuation of an ongoing IAEA probe into past alleged nuclear activities that breached international accords. While progress seemed to have been made on one sticking point – the US recognition of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organisation, which Tehran had originally requested be revoked in the context of the resumed Vienna talks – others quickly emerged to hamper progress. More fundamentally, however, it was the absence of trust between the sides that prevented a breakthrough. The election of a conservative government in Iran, led by President Ebrahim Raisi in June 2021, had changed Iran’s negotiating team, while the Biden administration’s troubles in Congress and with its regional ally Israel, prevented the display of greater flexibility on the side of the US. Events in the Persian ¶{p. 33}Gulf, with repeated missile and drone attacks from Yemen targeting the UAE in January and February, also contributed to keep tensions high [6] . Finally, the outbreak of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in late February would cast a long shadow on the JCPOA negotiations, as concern spread that either the US or Russia – a party to the JCPOA and Vienna talks – may politicise the process to score points against their rivals. Ultimately, these initial fears were overcome, but again no serious progress was made towards a deal. In March, missile attacks resumed from Yemen, including a major coordinated attack on Saudi oil facilities on 25 March [ACLED 2023], an event which drew international attention once again to the Persian Gulf and the ongoing conflict in Yemen. Following the attack and subsequent retribution by the Saudi-led coalition across Yemen, the UN announced a truce in the country. This was subsequently renewed twice until it expired in October 2022 [ACLED 2022]. While the truce brought important life-saving respite to a population suffering from one of the most acute humanitarian and emergency crises of the region, Yemen’s future remains increasingly uncertain as concern mounts following the refusal by warring parties to renew the UN deal.

Returning to Iran and the JCPOA negotiations, the subsequent period of summer 2022 was characterised by a flurry of diplomatic activity and shuttle diplomacy by the EU High Representative Joseph Borrell. Visiting Iran in June 2022, Borrell again made frantic attempts to dampen tensions and resume the spirit of compromise, leading to the resumption of indirect EU-mediated Iran-US talks in Doha, Qatar between 28-29 June. As the parties again failed to make progress, broader developments in the region seemed to be providing a conducive environment for rapprochement. Regional talks between Iran and its Arab neighbours had resumed, with reciprocal visits between Iranian and Emirati officials occurring in December 2021 and May 2022 leading eventually to the formal resumption of diplomatic relations between Iran and the UAE in August 2022 [Al Jazeera 2022m]. Meanwhile, talks between Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were also said to be advancing, further contributing to a hesitant détente in the ¶{p. 34}Persian Gulf between May and September [Yeranian 2022]. In this time span, the EU High Representative made two last-ditch attempts to bridge the gaps and mounting mistrust between the US and Iran, seeking creative means to reassure both sides and thereby salvage the JCPOA [Borrell 2022]. Yet proposals were repeatedly rejected by the sides, with Iran sending additional reservations to the draft text circulated by the EU and France, Germany and the UK, as well as the US Biden administration, insisting that the proposal was final. Ultimately, it was apparent that, with the November mid-term elections fast approaching in the US, talks over the JCPOA would have to be suspended as all sides regrouped and dug in on their respective positions.

By mid-September, however, conditions changed again. The outbreak of protests in Iran combined with news of Iran’s sale of military drones to Russia added important impediments to the talks, further undermining what little trust remained between the sides [International Crisis Group 2022c; Alcaro 2022]. Protests erupted following the arrest of Mahsa Amini, a young Kurdish-Iranian women, who died in police custody after being detained by Iran’s morality police in Tehran for not wearing the mandatory hair-covering headscarf in public. Demonstrations spread to multiple localities across Iran, with the authorities overseeing a brutal crackdown, jailing thousands and imposing the death penalty on many young citizens [Human Rights Watch 2022a]. Initially focusing on the morality police and calling for increased women’s rights and an end to the mandatory headscarf, the protests gradually mutated into overt calls for revolution and the toppling of the Islamic Republic. While significant and widespread, it remains unclear whether the protests can truly threaten the regime in Tehran. Compared to the protests of 2019 and more so 2009, the present wave is less numerous and more restricted across social strata and age groups. Mostly concentrated in Iran’s underprivileged minority regions and involving youth, Iranian authorities have resorted to different degrees of repression across the country. With over 300 dead according to UN figures from late November [UN News 2022a], other accounts have put the death toll at close to 500 since protests began in mid-September, including almost 20,000 arrests [HRANA 2022].