Salvatore Capasso, Giovanni Canitano (a cura di)
Mediterranean Economies 2023
DOI: 10.1401/9788815411167/c5
COVID 19 Impact. The COVID-19 pandemic had a substantial impact on the global markets for food and agriculture. Supply and
{p. 161}demand shocks took place, global supply chains were disrupted. The use of export restrictions to ensure food security re-emerged in a similar way to the quantitative restrictions during the price spikes of 2007-2008 [Martin and Glauber 2020], in addition to governmental support to the farming sector, and more flexible import restrictions [Hepburn et al. 2021]. In heavy net food importing countries(such as Egypt, Jordan, Palestine and Yemen), food prices surged because of the heavy import dependency, especially in cereals. The burden is heavier for countries that subsidize wheat flour and bread (such as Egypt), as they will have to increase their subsidies due to rising import prices. In several MENA countries, households had to face several challenges that affected their food purchase and consumption. According to the household survey results on difficulties related to getting food summarized in figure 8, 81 per cent of surveyed households in Tunisia reported being unable to buy the usual quantity of food because its price had increased and 77 per cent because household income decreased. Moreover, 60 per cent of the households had to cope by reducing their food consumption. At the same time, 59 per cent reported reduced food purchases due to supply shortages and 39 per cent due to restrictions imposed by the government on the mobility of people and/or market closures. In Morocco, the impact of COVID-19 on food security appears to be less severe, with only 9 per cent of the surveyed households reporting shortages in markets. In Morocco, the government responded to the crisis by adopting a more liberal approach, compared to other countries in the region. Tariffs were reduced on wheat, lentils, chickpeas, and beans [Mandour 2021]. Despite these measures, 50 per cent of the surveyed households reported an increase in prices, and 54 per cent reported a drop in their income that led to decreased food purchases. Nearly one third of the surveyed households had to adopt negative coping mechanisms by reducing their food intake. In the case of Jordan, shortages in markets and mobility issues also appear to be less of a challenge, while reduced food purchases due to increase in food prices and decrease in household income affected 50 per cent and 54 per cent, respectively. Among the surveyed households, 39 per cent had to cope with the effects of the pandemic by reducing their food intake. The picture looks slightly better for Egypt, where 10 per cent reported having difficulties accessing food because {p. 162}of mobility restrictions and 21 per cent reported shortages in the market. Egypt has implemented some export prohibitions on beans and lentils, expanded cash transfers and increased consumer subsidies to tackle both availability and access to food (ibidem). However, a share of 43 per cent and 46 per cent of the surveyed households reported a reduction in food consumption due to price surges and income drops, respectively. Finally, 44 per cent had to adopt negative coping mechanisms.
Fig. 8. Share of households who mentioned one of the following difficulties in getting food.
Note: Food security questions: «In the past 7 days, have you or any household member experienced any of the following?», «Mobility difficulties» is based on the question «Difficulties in going to food markets due to mobility restrictions imposed by government/closures». «Shortages in markets» is based on the question «Unable to buy the amount of food we usually buy because of shortages of food in markets». «Increase in prices» is based on the question «Unable to buy the amount of food we usually buy because the price of food increased». «Decrease in household income» is based on the question «Unable to buy the amount of food we usually buy because our household income has dropped» and «Reduce meals/portions» is based on the question «Had to reduce the number of meals and/or the portion of each meal we would usually eat».
Source: authors’ calculations based on ERF COVID-19 MENA Monitor.
Source: authors’ calculations based on ERF COVID-19 MENA Monitor.
War in Ukraine. Russia and Ukraine, together with the EU, USA and Canada, account for 75 per cent of the global exports of wheat [Smith and Glauber 2020]. In 2019, Russia and Ukraine accounted together for nearly 30 per cent of global wheat exports [Martin and Glauber 2020]. The MENA region heavily depends {p. 163}on the imports of several food items from Russia and Ukraine, such as wheat, sunflower oil seeds, and cereals. According to the International Trade Centre data for 2021, 29 per cent of total cereal imports come from both countries. The share of Russian cereals represented 17 per cent in the total imports of cereals, while that of Ukrainian cereals accounted for 12 per cent. MENA countries like Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia produce only between 30 per cent and 50 per cent of their cereal requirements domestically. Egypt, one of the largest cereals importers in the world, covers more than 86 per cent of its total wheat imports from Russia and Ukraine [Keulertz and Byiringiro 2022].
Fig. 9. Dependency of MENA region on Russia and Ukraine – (2019-2021).
Source: authors’ own elaboration using ITC dataset.
In Lebanon, this share is as high as 96 per cent. Other MENA countries like Libya, Oman, Qatar, and Tunisia, also source more than 50 per cent from both countries. In contrast to these heavy dependencies on Russian and Ukrainian wheat, other MENA countries such as Iraq, Algeria, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Palestine either do not import wheat from both countries or import a minor share (less than 2 per cent) (ibidem). As the war continues, more than half of the countries in the region will continue to suffer from long term supply chain disruptions and price surges. Given the population growth and the additional {p. 164}importance of some imported cereals for animal feed, the region’s dependency on cereal imports will continue to rise.

4.2. Structural Challenges

Increasing Population. Food security is not only a persistent challenge because of the region’s current exposure and vulnerability to global shocks, but also due to the persistence of longstanding structural challenges that will only worsen the status of food security in the future. Figure 10 depicts the population growth across different regions between 2026 and 2050. The estimations suggest that East Asia and the Pacific and South Asia are likely to witness the largest annual population growth, with 2 to 2.5 billion new births annually. Sub-Saharan Africa is also expected to witness rapid population growth during the same period, with 1.4 to 2.2 billion new births annually. In the MENA region, the population is expected to grow annually by 0.5 to 0.7 billion people between 2026 and 2050. Overall, the region’s {p. 165}population is expected to be above 533 million by 2030 and more than 694 million by 2050 [Keulertz and Byiringiro 2022]. Hence, the region will need to increase its food supply to match the population growth, while ensuring a healthy and diversified diet to meet the needs of the different age groups for micronutrients. In fact, one of the major challenges in the region is that healthy food (including fruit, vegetables, and animal protein) is unaffordable, forcing a significant proportion of the population to opt for more affordable starchy food and cereals (ibid).
Fig. 10. Projection of Population (2026-2050) – in billions.
Note: figures are in billions.
Source: United Nations Population Division. World Population Prospects (2022).
Source: United Nations Population Division. World Population Prospects (2022).
Water Stress. Climate changes, land degradation, and water stress represent a core threat to food security in the MENA region. According to IFPRI IMPACT model projections for 2050, climate changes leading to more frequent extreme climate events are expected to increase the number of food insecure households in developing countries [Smith and Glauber 2020]. This also applies to the MENA region, where agricultural output is expected to drop by the end of the century [Lee, Mohtar and Yoo 2019].
In fact, the MENA region is among the driest regions in the world, with an annual regional average of 1,200 cubic meters per capita, compared to a global average of 7,000 cubic meters per capita [Zolfaghari and Jariani 2021]. The region is home to 5 per cent of the global population but has access to only 1 per cent of the world’s renewable water supply, and total water demand exceeds the available water supply by almost 20 per cent [Martens 2017].
Moreover, only 30 per cent of the land in the region is suitable for agriculture [Mandour 2021]. Figure 11 depicts the actual status of water stress in the MENA region. With the exception of few areas along the Nile, the North African coast, and some areas in Iraq, MENA countries suffer from high to extremely high water stress (fig. 11). Due to these natural constraints, the potential for increasing agriculture in the region is limited. Given that agriculture uses about 80 per cent of the total water supply in many MENA countries, enhancing water management may help with increasing agricultural output [Woertz 2017].
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