With states and societies still reeling from the multidimensional effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) continued to face compounding challenges of an internal and external nature between mid-2021 and late 2022. While on the one hand this period witnessed a continuation of previous trends of re-alignment and rapprochement between certain regional adversaries, on the other, internal dynamics within many MENA states remain a significant source of concern as worsening socio-economic indicators mixed with sustained trends of authoritarian consolidation render the MENA particularly prone to sudden outbursts of instability. Such vulnerabilities are further aggravated by low levels of intra-regional trade and integration as well as ongoing dependencies with outlying regions, elements that make the MENA particularly exposed to sudden international crises, as indeed witnessed during the COVID-19 pandemic and, since February 2022, with the global implications of the Russian invasion of Ukraine [OECD 2021; Saidi and Prasad 2022].

Covering a period that stretches from the US and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 and ending with Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to the Arabian Peninsula in December 2022, our analysis traces the broad regional and international trends impacting MENA states and societies. Within this timeframe, resurgent competition between the ‘great powers’ following the Russian invasion of Ukraine has clearly dominated international agendas. While the war in Ukraine tends to be seen as a «European affair» [Florensa 2022] by many MENA states, who seek neutrality or balancing rather than risk compromising relations with either Russia (and China) or the EU and US, fallout from the Russian war and sanctions on Moscow have had serious implications for the MENA. Similarly, there is much concern that an increasingly multipolar Middle East and North Africa may once again become a theatre of great power conflict, with both Russia and China having expanded their presence in recent years and the EU and US now actively enhancing efforts to push back and counter such influence, from Iran to Syria, Libya, the Sahel and broader Africa [Wehrey 2022].

Beyond the fallout from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and its impact on food security, energy prices and current account deficits, significant concern revolves around the breakdown in nuclear talks with Iran. Revived tensions in the Persian Gulf in late 2022 may foreshadow the beginnings of a renewed era of offensive containment and possible conflict between Tehran and its regional and international rivals. Such a dynamic would have carry-on effects on the broader Middle East and may indeed become the clearest example of the growing juxtaposition of great power competition over other, pre-existing conflict lines in the region, given Iran’s increased orientation towards Moscow and Beijing. Aside from Iran, accelerated processes of authoritarian consolidation across much of the MENA are also a source of concern. From the Maghreb to the Mashreq, the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula, all states in the region have experienced a further consolidation of state control over society, while the forces of change and reform are barely if ever visible. Having exploited the COVID-19 pandemic to stifle renewed protest that had emerged in 2019, ruling elites further tightened the screws on dissent during much of 2021 and 2022. From the deep political and economic crises in Lebanon and Iraq, to the sustained democratic backsliding in Tunisia, aborted elections in Libya, the harsh repression in Iran and the ongoing waves of arrests in Morocco, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, no country in the broader MENA is spared from these general trends of authoritarian consolidation. Finally, the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections in Turkey, scheduled for May 2023, are also heightening tensions, while further highlighting the weakening of institutions and the rule of law in the country, as the Turkish ¶{p. 27}president is again exploiting the courts to undermine political rivals [Al Jazeera 2022h]. The Turkish economy continues to struggle and President Erdogan is again utilising strong rhetoric and dangerous brinkmanship abroad to enhance his electoral chances, leading to increased tensions with Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean and repeated military raids in northern Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan during the latter part of 2022.

Against this backdrop, the following analysis will separately address developments in the Middle East before focussing on North Africa. Emphasising the US and Europe’s declining influence in an increasingly multipolar Middle East, the analysis will cover the impact of the Ukraine war and developments surrounding Iran and the Persian Gulf. Further sections will tackle the Syrian crisis and recent developments in Iraq as well as the evolution of the previous trends of rapprochement between Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt and Israel. Moving on to North Africa, we will take stock of recent developments in Libya, Tunisia and the ongoing rivalry between Morocco and Algeria surrounding Western Sahara.

A cursory overview of developments in the Middle East over the past year provides a mixed bag of worsening socio-economic and political fragilities amidst ongoing (albeit uneven) efforts to promote regional integration and détente. This section will first examine the fallout from the conflict in Ukraine before turning attention to the Persian Gulf and Iran. A final section will tackle the evolution of the Syrian crisis and recent developments in Iraq against the backdrop of accelerated moves towards normalisation with the Syrian regime and more general forms of rapprochement between Turkey, Israel and the Arab monarchies.

The Russian war in Ukraine and the global energy crisis that followed in its wake have dominated international agendas and heightened socio-economic fragilities across much of the world, ¶{p. 28}including the MENA. Multiple states in the region – and particularly Egypt, Lebanon and Tunisia, as well as Turkey – are highly dependent on imports of grain, cereals and fertilisers from Russia and Ukraine. This quickly raised concerns that the blockage of Black Sea ports as a result of the war could catapult yet another crisis in the Middle East, leading to possible new migration waves, social unrest or other forms of socio-economic and political instability [Hiltermann et al. 2022]. Accounting for 6 per cent of the world population, the MENA region already hosted 20 per cent of the world’s severely food-insecure people back in 2020, figures that have worsened considerably over the past two years in light of the combined shocks of COVID-19 and the Russian war on Ukraine [Belhaj and Soliman 2021; Abis and Bertin 2022].

While the worst fears of food insecurity were ultimately avoided thanks to the UN and Turkish brokered agreement on the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2022 [1] , the medium-term effects in much of the region have yet to fully materialise. Not to be underestimated, these will include skyrocketing debt and significant strains on public spending, particularly for those states heavily reliant on food and energy imports or already struggling with conflict and internal fragmentation. Such trends stem from price increases linked to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a dynamic that is compounding pre-existing fragilities due to COVID-19’s impact on the informal job sector, tourism revenues and public health costs. Indeed, the World Bank expects real per capita GDP to return to pre-pandemic levels in only six out of eighteen MENA countries by the end of 2022, while nine will achieve that goal by the end of 2023 [2] . Significantly, these forecasts can be expected to worsen should the global economy continue to suffer, as many MENA trading partners are expected to enter recession in 2023 while Chinese growth continues to be held back by the pandemic [Klein 2022; The Guardian 2023]. Considering the multiple challenges facing the MENA in the near future, from the energy transition and the climate emergency, socio-economic conditions remain deeply worrying ¶{p. 29}for many parts of the region, meaning that further eruptions of social unrest and instability cannot be discounted [IMF 2022b; Belhaj, Gatti, Lederman et al. 2022].

Aside from exacerbating socio-economic inequalities and food insecurity, the war in Ukraine has also reinforced the pre-existing divide between energy importing and exporting states in the MENA. While hydrocarbon exporters have benefited from the skyrocketing price of oil and gas to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic and protect against global shocks, energy importers have witnessed a further erosion of living standards and internal hardship. This has crystallised a two-tier regional system where the energy-rich Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and their allies in Egypt, Israel and less so Morocco have consolidated their role as the central locus of gravity within the region, commanding extensive political and economic influence that is unmatched by others in the area. Such dynamics can also be linked to the so-called Abraham Accords, which have united the UAE, Israel, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco. Backed by the US and the European Union, and enjoying tacit support from Saudi Arabia, the Accords are indeed serving as a platform for enhanced economic, energy and high-tech integration in a central section of the Middle East.