L'analisi economica del settore riguardante le concessionarie di autostrade consente di valutare gli intrecci tra interessi statali e locali, tra interessi pubblici e privati ed i vari modi in cui i privati riescono ad accaparrarsi rendite a scapito della collettività. Avendo applicato per primo, dagli anni '20, l'istituto della concessione per lo sviluppo delle autostrade ed avendo privatizzato per primo la maggiore concessionaria di Stato, il nostro paese è, in questo senso, un eccellente caso di studio. Rivalutazioni monetarie, proroghe delle concessioni e regolazione delle tariffe possono generare alti profitti senza che l'opinione pubblica ne percepisca in nessun modo i costi. Questo volume, nell'illustrare le distorsioni del sistema e i privilegi delle concessionarie di autostrade in Italia, traccia una storia emblematica dei fallimenti dello Stato come regolatore di monopoli naturali. Oltre ad una critica radicale dei presupposti stessi del sistema concessorio, nella sua disamina l'autore avanza anche alcuni suggerimenti per una diversa politica del settore.

After a brief analysis of how highways are fi nanced and managed in European countries, the book traces the history of highway concessions in Italy, starting from 1930. Construction was essentially fi nanced by debt, with only minimal capital contributions from the shareholders of the 20 concessionaires. Their profi ts have been extraordinarily high. The main reasons were monetary revaluation of assets, long extensions of the concession period and generous tariff increases. Tariffs were originally set on the basis of «cost of service», but a «price cap» system was introduced in 1999. Shortcomings of this system are analysed, and the merits of various criteria for setting and adjusting tolls over time are discussed. Two thirds of the network was built by a state-owned company which was then privatized in 1999. The history and terms of this privatization are critically analyzed and compared with similar privatizations which took place in France more recently. The author fi nally draws some general conclusions from the Italian experience. Risks of «rent seeking» in this sector are high, since users are unaware of the additional costs and concession contracts are complex and not made public. Assigning concessions through auctions leads to fragmentation and irrational tariff structure. Highway tolls are actually a tax, whose level should be set by a public authority so as to maximize social welfare, not just to cover the cost of each tract. Each concessionaire should be remunerated from revenues collected over the entire network and not from tolls paid by the users of its specifi c tract of highway. Benefi ts from competition may be better obtained through unbundling.

transport infrastructures, roads, privatization, regulation and tolls.